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The global ecosystem continues to display signs of strain because
of a policy of inadequate responses that are not entirely commensurate
with the challenge and a substantial gap between prescribed and actual
behavior within and across State boundaries.1 Weak adherence to inter-
national environmental law, one of the factors contributing to the disparity
between normative expectations and observed outcomes, has been explored
extensively by legal researchers.2 Some of the insights that have been gen-
erated may be fruitfully examined in light of the problematic Chinese
experience on the ecological front.
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INTRODUCTION
China conjures up conflicting images. On the one hand, it is a coun-
try inspired by elaborate systems of ethics that respect the environment,
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26 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 119, 119–20 (2009).
2 See, e.g., D. G. Victor et al., Introduction and Overview, in THE IMPLEMENTATION AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMITMENTS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 1, 7 (David G. Victor et al. eds., 1998) (stating “International environmental law
is filled with examples of agreements that have had high compliance but limited influence
on behavior . . . . Standards can be too weak, too strong, inefficient, or completely ill
conceived.”); Jeffrey A. McNeely, Applying the Diversity of International Conventions to
Address the Challenges of Climate Change, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L 123, 137 (2008).
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notably Taoism and Buddhism, whose reconstructed economy seems to
defy gravity.3 On the other hand, it is a nation evidently capable of ex-
traordinary myopia and egregious excesses in the environmental
domain.4 This pattern manifests itself in related spheres of socio-physical
activity, where striking a balance between creation and preservation is
an ongoing concern.5 In a quintessentially Chinese fashion, the two
images coexist uncomfortably and vie for attention but, paradoxically,
are also inextricably linked and mutually dependent.6
China’s robust economic performance in the post-Mao era has
attracted substantial interest from both academic researchers and policy
analysts.7 Differing accounts have been offered to explain the economy’s
persistent dynamism and resilience.8 Mainstream views, however, have
consistently converged regarding outcomes.9 The consensus is that living
standards have risen dramatically over a relatively short period of time,
which is an impressive achievement for a country saddled with such a
large population and several serious challenges.10
Traditionally, environmental degradation has not featured
prominently on the scholarly and public agendas.11 Indeed, as matters
stand, the ecological imperative continues to be eclipsed by its economic
counterpart.12 Nevertheless, the environment looms increasingly large in
academic studies and in policy discourse.13 Additionally, the growing 
3 See ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE RIVER RUNS BLACK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE
TO CHINA’S FUTURE 55 (2004).
4 See id. at 55–56; see also Xiaofan Li, Environmental Concerns in China: Problems,
Policies, and Global Implications, 81 INT’L SOC. SCI. REV. 43, 46 (2006).
5 See Li, supra note 4, at 46.
6 See id. at 46–47.
7 See, e.g., Miron Mushkat, Economic Reform, Discontinuous Change and China’s Future,
in 2 PERSPECTIVES ON GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT AND TECHNOLOGY 255 (2003).
8 See id. at 255–57.
9 See id.
10 See id.
11 See Li, supra note 4, at 43.
12 Id. at 46.
13 For books discussing environmental issues affecting China see ECONOMY, supra note
3; RICHARD L. EDMONDS, PATTERNS OF CHINA’S LOST HARMONY: A SURVEY OF THE
COUNTRY’S ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND PROTECTION (1994); MARK ELVIN, THE
RETREAT OF THE ELEPHANTS: AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF CHINA (2004); XIAOYING MA
& LEONARD ORTOLANO, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION IN CHINA: INSTITUTIONS,
ENFORCEMENT, AND COMPLIANCE (2000); GEOFFREY MURRAY & IAN G. COOK, GREEN
CHINA: SEEKING ECOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVES (2002); LESTER ROSS, ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY IN CHINA (1988); CHINA’S ENVIRONMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE 
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volume of work discussing environmental issues affecting China adopts a
tone, characterized by greater intensity and sense of urgency.14
Symptoms of environmental dislocation abound in China.15 They
assume a variety of acute forms, including widespread deforestation, de-
sertification, disease, flooding, pollution, and water scarcity.16 A burgeoning
population and many policy practices detrimental to ecological sustain-
ability are at the root of these severe problems.17 Although the current
effect of such policies is unclear, such practices had once been largely re-
sponsible for the rapid population expansion witnessed throughout Chinese
history, particularly during the modern era.18
Over the centuries, China’s leaders tended to relegate the environ-
ment to the strategic periphery.19 Their energies had been channeled
toward accumulating power, gaining control over territory, bolstering the
economy, and driving up the size of the population to increase China’s
source of labor, military manpower, and revenue.20 This relentless pursuit
of a narrowly-focused policy mix had placed enormous pressure on natural
resources and, in turn, had led to frequent famines, physical disasters,
political conflicts, and wars.21 No sturdy conservation ethos had emerged
to act as a countervailing force.22
Contrary to the prevailing view, Confucianism had displayed an
anthropocentric bias, encouraging an instrumental attitude toward nature
and its exploitation for the benefit of humankind.23 Consequently, the
institutional infrastructure designed to protect the environment had
been rudimentary and structurally deficient.24 Throughout the imperial
era and beyond, including the initial phases of the post-1978 reform
period, China’s leaders had preferred to rely on a highly personal system
DEVELOPMENT (2005); MANAGING THE CHINESE ENVIRONMENT (Richard Louis Edmonds
ed., 2000).
14 See, e.g., Srini Sitaraman, Regulating the Belching Dragon: Rule of Law, Politics of
Enforcement, and Pollution Prevention in Post-Mao Industrial China, 18 COLO. J. INT’L
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 267, 275–80 (2007); Yuhong Zhao, Trade and Environment: Challenges
After China’s WTO Accession, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 41, 95–97 (2007).
15 See ECONOMY, supra note 3, at 17.
16 Id. at 9–10.
17 See id. at 10.
18 See id. at 9–10, 41–43, 64–71, 84–85; see also MURRAY & COOK, supra note 13, at 1–23.
19 See ECONOMY, supra note 3, at 17.
20 Id. at 17, 41.
21 See id. at 27; see also MURRAY & COOK, supra note 13, at 24–36.
22 ECONOMY, supra note 3, at 17.
23 Id. at 55.
24 See id. at 17–18.
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of moral suasion virtually bereft of environmental regulations and codified
environmental laws.25
Responses to ecological challenges, particularly of the highly disrup-
tive variety, did materialize periodically.26 However, they typically assumed
the form of ad hoc mass mobilization campaigns characterized by poor
planning, coordination, implementation, and follow-up.27 The lack of a
coherent strategy, long-term vision, methodical organization effort, and
time consistency often nullified the potential benefits of the entire under-
taking.28 For example, “large-scale infrastructure projects, such as dams
or river diversions . . . wreaked havoc on local ecosystems.”29
This deeply-entrenched historical pattern had remained intact
throughout Mao Zedong’s rule (1949–1976), a period that featured a
high degree of ideological intensity, voluntarism, including mass line,
campaigns, and guided spontaneity, class struggle, anti-intellectualism,
self-reliance, institutional opaqueness, legal fragility, and policy shifts.30
Deng Ziaoping, Mao’s pragmatic successor, also sustained this pattern well
into the reform era, two years following the latter’s death and the disman-
tling of the revolutionary power structure.31
As economic reform gained momentum, output growth accelerated
dramatically.32 The standard of living of Chinese people improved corre-
spondingly, albeit in an uneven fashion, and the country had been trans-
formed into a regional, possibly even global, industrial power.33 At the
same time, the environmental costs of breakneck economic expansion,
which accounted for a substantial portion of gross domestic product, had
been persistently de-emphasized, with development being pursued in a
single-minded manner during the 1980s and much of the 1990s.34 As
noted by a prominent Sinologist:
Rates of air and water pollution have skyrocketed. By 2002,
China had become home to six of the ten most polluted
25 Id. at 17, 57; MURRAY & COOK, supra note 13, at 24–36.
26 See ECONOMY, supra note 3, at 17–18.
27 See id.
28 See id. at 17–18, 45–46.
29 Id. at 17.
30 See KENNETH LIEBERTHAL, GOVERNING CHINA: FROM REVOLUTION THROUGH REFORM
62–77 (W.W. Norton & Co. 2d ed. 2004).
31 See id. at 125–27.
32 See ECONOMY, supra note 3, at 60–62.
33 See id.; LIEBERTHAL, supra note 30, at 243–72; MURRAY & COOK, supra note 13, at xiii.
34 See ECONOMY, supra note 3, at 60–64; LIEBERTHAL, supra note 30, at 276–80, 282–90;
MURRAY & COOK, supra note 13, at 5, 214.
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cities in the world. Acid rain now affects about one-third
of China’s territory, including approximately one-third of
its farmland. More than 75 percent of the water in rivers
flowing through China’s urban areas is unsuitable for
drinking or fishing. Desert now covers 25 percent of China’s
territory, and deforestation and grassland degradation con-
tinue largely unabated . . . .
In addition, pollution-related illnesses are soaring.
There have been serious outbreaks of waterborne disease, as
well as long-term health problems in riverside communities
reflected in rising rates of spontaneous abortion, birth de-
fects, and premature death. Air pollution alone, primarily
from coal burning, is responsible for over 300,000 prema-
ture deaths per year.35
The distinctly uncomfortable realities which this picture repre-
sents are no longer marginalized by policy makers.36 They now display
an acute awareness of the adverse consequences of environmental
decay, such as the risk of voluntary and forced massive migratory waves
induced by resource depletion.37 Moreover, they are confronting a rising
tide of grassroots protest over air and water pollution, compulsory
resettlement, damaged crops, deteriorating health conditions, and scar-
city of key basic goods.38 This, in turn, poses a threat to the authority of
the Communist Party and the stability of the regime.39
Despite a more favorable attitudinal climate and less skewed set of
policy priorities, a strong tension between economic, or for that matter
national security, and environmental goals persists.40 To illustrate,
shrinking grain yields in the 1990s and beyond have led to a growing de-
pendence on external sources of supply, triggering concerns about food self-
sufficiency.41 These concerns resulted in a large-scale land reclamation
effort and campaign to boost grain production to the detriment of the eco-
system.42 Massive economic development programs in sensitive border
35 ECONOMY, supra note 3, at 18–19.
36 See id. at 19–20.
37 See id. at 45.
38 See id. at 19, 81–89.
39 Id. at 19, 85–88.
40 Id. at 19.
41 ECONOMY, supra note 3, at 19.
42 See id. at 19.
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areas inhabited by potentially recalcitrant minorities, such as the Tibetans,
have had similar consequences.43
The purpose of the present article is to explore compliance with
domestic and international environmental regimes. While the article favors
the international environmental regimes, it also selectively addresses the
domestic dynamics because the two segments of the politico-economic arena
cannot be entirely separated from each other. However, the concept of a
regime or environmental regime, which presupposes compliance with its
precepts, is examined first in order to place the subsequent discussion in
the appropriate analytical context.
I. INTERNATIONAL REGIMES REVISITED
Conflict and cooperation are enduring behavioral characteristics of
the international system of politico-economic relations.44 Traditionally, the
former has been accorded far greater attention.45 Members of the realist
school of thought focus on it almost exclusively in their theoretical formu-
lations, albeit at times in an indirect fashion.46 This attention stems from
the perception that international politico-economic processes essentially
consist of “a competition of units in the kind of state of nature that knows
no restraints other than those which the changing necessities of the game
and the shallow conveniences of the players impose.”47
The absence of an effective central/supranational authority, capable
of enacting and enforcing rules decisively, is the key factor underpinning
this negative assessment.48 The anarchic condition, or vacuum-like con-
figuration, that is the product of such pervasive fragmentation compels
relevant actors or States to rely predominantly on “the means they can
generate and the arrangements they can make for themselves.”49 Conflict
inevitably ensues, often culminating in military confrontation, because
each party or state involved “is the final judge of its own cause . . . [and]
may at any time use force to implement its policies.”50
43 Id.
44 See STANLEY HOFFMAN, THE STATE OF WAR: ESSAYS ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS vii–viii (1965).
45 See id.
46 See CARSTEN HOLBRAAD, INTERNATIONALISM AND NATIONALISM IN EUROPEAN POLITICAL
THOUGHT 14 (2003).
47 HOFFMAN, supra note 44, at vii.
48 See KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 111 (1979).
49 Id.
50 KENNETH N. WALTZ, MAN, THE STATE, AND WAR: A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 160 (1959).
See ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE INEQUALITY OF NATIONS 4 (1977).
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This conception of the structure and operation of the international
system of politico-economic relations does not preclude the possibility of
alliance cooperation.51 However, it is assumed to come into play just as an
extension of conflict, rather than as a force inspired by the intrinsic merits
of joint action.52 Alliance formation is thus an instrumental response to
threats emanating from the external environment and reflecting deeply-
rooted struggles for power.53 Other forms of international cooperation may
be ascribed to similar motives, although not necessarily in such an unam-
biguous manner.54
At the other end of the international behavioral continuum is the
institutional school of thought, whose members regard widespread and
persistent cooperation as vital in an international setting marked by com-
plex patterns of interdependence.55 The actors or States are tightly bound
together and share common interests which outweigh the competitive
influences, prompting them to jointly seek mutually-beneficial institutions
and rules.56 The institutional edifice that emerges is not merely a symbolic
device but a meaningful set of “patterns of practice around which expecta-
tions converge.”57
The fundamentally opposed realist and institutional perspectives
may be partially reconciled by incorporating the role played by hegemonic
powers into the two explanatory frameworks.58 The inherently conflict-
ridden international politico-economic structure depicted in pure realist
accounts may be transformed into one selectively displaying cooperative
features and functioning in a generally orderly fashion when a single actor
or State, possessing superior economic and military capabilities, is in a posi-
tion to determine the rules of the game and shape system-wide behavior
over a substantial period of time.59 British dominance in the nineteenth
century and American preponderance following the Second World War
51 See ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE




55 See DAVID MITRANY, THE FUNCTIONAL THEORY OF POLITICS 101 (1975).
56 See id.
57 Oran R. Young, International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation, 32 WORLD
POLITICS 331, 332 (1980).
58 See Robert O. Keohane, The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International
Economic Regimes, 1967–1977, in CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 131, 136–37
(Ole R. Holsti et al. eds., 1980).
59 See id.
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is commonly invoked in support of this proposition.60 During both eras,
a richly endowed nation-state actor, enjoying control over raw materials,
sources of capital, markets, and competitive advantage in the production
of highly valued goods, was apparently able to recast the international
politico-economic structure in light of its interests and manage it accord-
ingly: “The Pax Britannica and the Pax Americana, like the Pax Romana,
ensured an international system of relative peace and security. Great
Britain and the United States created and enforced the rules of a liberal
international economic order.”61
Two assumptions thus underlie the analytical framework of the
theory of hegemonic stability, which may narrow, at the conceptual and
practical level, the gap between the contrasting realist and institutional
approaches to international politico-economic dynamics. First, that inter-
actor or State patterns of cooperation are the product of the designs of a
single superior power.62 Second, that the maintenance of these patterns is
predicated on the persistence of the hegemonic configuration: “[F]or the
world economy to be stabilized, there has to be a stabilizer, one stabilizer.”63
The hegemonic construct does narrow the analytical gap some-
what, but it falls short of shrinking it significantly. Institutionally-oriented
researchers balk at the notion that cooperation is exclusively inspired by
the naked self-interest of players in the international arena, whether richly
endowed or otherwise.64 Moreover, while acknowledging that hegemony
may be conducive to the development of certain cooperative relationships,
they reject the idea that it “is either a necessary or sufficient condition for
the emergence of cooperative relationships.”65 By the same token, they take
exception to the argument that hegemonic dominance is required to
sustain cooperative schemes following their establishment, therefore
demonstrating a reluctance to unambiguously embrace either of the two
assumptions upon which hegemonic theory rests.66
It should be noted that institutional accounts of international be-
havior, particularly those of a recent vintage such as neo-institutional
variants, do not equate cooperation with harmony.67 Rather, the latter
60 Id. at 137.
61 Id. at 136–37; ROBERT GILPIN, WAR AND CHANGE IN WORLD POLITICS 145 (1981).
62 GILPIN, supra note 61, at 29.
63 CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION 1929–1939 305 (1973).
64 KEOHANE, supra note 51, at 31.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 31–32.
67 Id. at 51.
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term is employed with reference to contexts where actors’ moves, taken in
their own self-interest without regard to others, “automatically facilitate
the attainment of others’ goals.”68 This manifests itself most vividly in the
perfectly competitive markets conjured up by neoclassical economists, “in
which the Invisible Hand ensures that the pursuit of self-interest by each
contributes to the interest of all.”69
By contrast, cooperation presupposes a conscious adjustment, via
well-defined channels, informal as well as formal; for example, customary
law versus treaty law in the actions of players, which are not in pre-exis-
tent harmony and need to be realigned in order to bring about a higher
degree of convergence.70 This goal is typically pursued through a process
of negotiation or policy coordination, whether explicit or implicit in
nature,71 and “intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the pol-
icies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as
facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of
policy coordination.”72
As indicated, cooperation is not altogether absent from the realist
worldview.73 Nor, by definition, is policy coordination.74 Even given the lack
of central authority capable of imposing constraints on the pursuit of
sovereign interests, researchers who posit that States dwell in perpetual
anarchy concede that cooperation and policy coordination is inherently
possible and periodically takes place in a Hobbesian-like politico-eco-
nomic setting.
Despite the absence of any ultimate international authority,
governments often bind themselves to mutually advanta-
geous courses of action. And, though no international sov-
ereign stands ready to enforce the terms of the agreement,
states can realize common interests through tacit coopera-
tion, formal bilateral and multilateral negotiation, and the
creation of international regimes.75
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 See KEOHANE, supra note 51, at 51–52.
71 See id. at 51.
72 Id. at 51–52.
73 See id. at 7, 51.
74 See id. at 51.
75 Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies,
38 WORLD POL. 1, 1 (1985).
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Moreover, the picture painted by realist scholars is not static. The
prospects of cooperation and policy coordination may be enhanced in a
variety of ways. For example, if inter-State interaction may be concep-
tualized in game-theoretic terms, there may be a potential to alter existing
payoff structures in order to achieve more palatable outcomes from a
system-wide and individual player perspective.76 Iteration, or ongoing
contact and exchanges, may produce similar effects in such circum-
stances.77 The same apparently holds true for strategies focused on keeping
the number of actors involved in any particular situation at relatively
modest levels.78
Expanding realist horizons notwithstanding, the notion of interna-
tional cooperation and policy coordination has far deeper institutional
roots. The idea of an international regime, while not inconsistent with aug-
mented realist or neo-realist constructions of the international order, is
also more closely aligned with institutional thinking.79 Realist accommoda-
tion broadens its applicability, but the vigor, if any, is drawn from insti-
tutional sources.80 In addition, analytical formulations derived from the
latter inject great complexity into the relationship between regimes and
the factors influencing their emergence and operations; “[a]lthough regimes
themselves depend on conditions that are conducive to interstate agree-
ments, they may also facilitate further efforts to coordinate policies.”81
When introduced in 1975, the concept of an international regime
was defined as “a set of mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans,
organizational energies and financial commitments which have been
accepted by a group of [S]tates.”82 This portrayal furnished the catalyst for
substantial work on the subject, but as theoretical exploration and
76 See id. at 1–11; Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, 38 WORLD
POL. 25 (1985); Robert Axelrod & Robert O. Keohane, Achieving Cooperation under
Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, 38 WORLD POL. 228–232 (1985). See generally
ROBERT AXELROD, Introduction to THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION: AGENT-BASED
MODELS OF COMPETITION AND COOPERATION (1997) (discussing the addition of complexity
to the two-person iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma and the uses and techniques of complexity
theory); KEOHANE, supra note 51, at 65–109 (discussing theories of cooperation and
international regimes).
77 See Oye, supra note 75, at 1–4, 12–18.
78 See id. at 4, 18–22; see also Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 76, at 234–38.
79 See KEOHANE, supra note 51, at 57–64.
80 See id. at 63 (stating that “[t]heories of regimes can incorporate Realist insights about
the role of power and interest, while also indicating the inadequacy of theories that define
interests so narrowly that they fail to take the role of institutions into account.”).
81 Id. at 57.
82 John G. Ruggie, International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends, 29 INT’L
ORG. 557, 570 (1975).
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empirical research gathered momentum, the need to stretch the boundaries
and provide further elaboration arose. A more comprehensive and detailed
definition emerged from a subsequent conference devoted to systematically
examining the evolving analytical underpinnings of international regimes.83
It was collectively concluded at this juncture that regimes constitute:
sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and deci-
sion making procedures around which actors’ expectations
converge in a given area of international relations. Prin-
ciples are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are
standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obliga-
tions. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for
action. Decision making procedures are prevailing practices
for making and implementing collective choice.84
This definition has four key components: principles, norms, rules,
and decision making procedures.85 The distinctions may be easier to estab-
lish at the theoretical than practical level. The underlying hierarchical
structure, however, seems basically sound, featuring a logical progression
from the general and strategic to the specific and operational elements.86
Despite a certain degree of ambiguity, this remains the most authoritative
definition of the concept of international regime, or at least one almost
invariably employed as a starting point in the still expanding academic
work on the subject.87
The use of strong terms such as principles, norms, rules, and deci-
sion making procedures within a coherent analytical framework may con-
vey the impression that proponents of the international regime notion,
particularly those of institutional persuasion, view it as a fundamentally
robust entity. This is not necessarily the case. They typically highlight the
differences between domestic regimes and their international counter-
parts, emphasizing the inherent fragility of the latter.88 Realists, of course,
go further than institutionalists in this respect.89
83 See Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, in INTERNATIONAL REGIMES x, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983).
84 Id. at 2.
85 Id.
86 See id. at 2–5.
87 See id. at 2–4.
88 See John G. Ruggie, Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a
Neorealist Synthesis, 35 WORLD POL. 261, 270 (1983).
89 WALTZ, supra note 48, at 110. Cf. Ruggie, supra note 88 (critiquing Waltz’s theory, as
laid out in Theory of International Politics, as too static).
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II. THE ECOLOGICAL DIMENSION
Environmental researchers embrace the concept of a regime as
outlined in the international relations, politics, and economics literature;
“regimes are social institutions consisting of agreed upon principles, norms,
rules, procedures, and programs that govern the interactions of actors in
specific issue areas.”90 Given the narrower scope of their theoretical and
empirical inquiries, they tend, however, to accord greater attention to the
specific components of the definition, or to distinguish more clearly be-
tween international orders and international regimes.91 The former are
“broad, framework arrangements governing the activities of all (or almost
all) the members of international society over a wide range of specific
issues.”92 The latter, “by contrast, are more specialized arrangements that
pertain to well-defined activities, resources, or geographical areas and often
involve only some subset of the members of international society.”93 Thus,
[w]e speak of the international regimes for whaling, the
conservation of polar bears, the use of electromagnetic
spectrum, and human activities in Antarctica. Because the
members of international society are [S]tates, the rules or
conventions of regimes apply, in the first instance, to the
actions of [S]tates. Yet the parties actually engaging in the
activities governed by regimes are frequently private en-
tities such as multinational corporations, banks, fishing
companies, or privately owned airlines.94
In grappling with the notion of a regime, environmental scholars
follow a similar path to that of their international relations counterparts,
albeit not mechanically because their priorities may diverge, and serious
concerns about ecological degradation may shift the focus toward impacts
rather than causes.95 Thus, they commonly address issues such as regime
90 Oran R. Young & Mark Levy, The Effectiveness of International Regimes, in THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES: CAUSAL CONNECTIONS
AND BEHAVIORAL MECHANISMS 1, 1 (Oran R. Young ed., 1999) (internal citation
omitted) [hereinafter Young & Levy].
91 ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR NATURAL
RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 13 (1989).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 13–14.
95 See, e.g., Oran R. Young, Rights, Rules, and Resources in World Affairs, in GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE: DRAWING INSIGHTS FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL EXPERIENCE 1, 12–13 (Oran
R. Young ed., 1997) [hereinafter Young, Rights, Rules, and Resources in World Affairs].
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characteristics, essence, regime types, regime formation, regime conse-
quences and effectiveness, and regime change.96 The question of regime
implementation, which encompasses the subject of compliance, is generally
dealt with in the broader context of consequences and effectiveness.97
Regime characteristics are normally portrayed in terms echoing the
established definition of the concept.98 Given that States, even in capitalist
societies, often hold title to a substantial portion of the land and its associ-
ated natural resources, a distinction is also frequently drawn between
sovereign rights/imperium and property rights/dominium.99 The purpose
of the distinction is to highlight the fact that, impressions to the contrary
notwithstanding, international environmental regimes primarily revolve
around the former rather than the latter, i.e., entitlements of political
authority as distinct from mechanisms designed to bring order into the
interactions of property owners.100
Some environmental researchers choose to emphasize the differ-
ence between substantive and procedural regime characteristics.101 The
former refer to the prescriptive core of the regime, principles, norms, and
rules, or, at a more concrete level, rights and obligations; and the latter,
to “recognized practices relied [on] for handling situations requiring social
or collective choices.”102 Some environmental regimes do not possess their
own procedural instruments and depend on support from external sources,
either provided by parallel regimes or based on arrangements embedded
in the international order.103 Designing and managing the procedural
component of regime architecture may be a challenging undertaking as
complex efficiency and equity considerations are often involved.104
Several permutations are possible in classifying international envi-
ronmental regimes. The relevant criterion may be the nature of the system
that is being targeted—biological, physical, or a combination of the two.105
Alternatively, the key yardstick may be the geographical scope of the
96 Id.
97 See id. at 5–18; ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE
ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY 26–32 (1994) [hereinafter YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE].
98 See, e.g., Young, Rights, Rules, and Resources in World Affairs, supra note 95, at 5–7.
99 Id. at at 6.
100 Id. at 6–7.
101 See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 91, at 14–19.
102 Id. at 15, 18.
103 See id. at 19.
104 Id. at 15–19.
105 See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 97, at 19.
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regime—extending from the restricted to the global end of the contin-
uum.106 Another way to conceptualize scope might be in terms of the
number of participants: limited versus all-inclusive.107
However, the most widely invoked typology of international en-
vironmental regimes employs jurisdictional authority as the pertinent
factor.108 Broad ecological governance systems are thus classified into those
focusing on international commons,109 shared natural resources,110 and
transboundary externalities.111
The formation of international environmental regimes is approached
from different perspectives that have not been synthesized.112 Some re-
searchers seek to identify the distinct stages through which the process
evolves–“[t]he agenda formation stage, the negotiation stage, and the opera-
tionalization stage”113–or to explore the role played by autonomous influ-
ences in regime formation.114 This is an essentially descriptive undertaking,
albeit one not wholly devoid of explanatory and evaluative elements.115
Explanation-centered frameworks generally target variables which
may account for the emergence of international environmental regimes,
including ideas emanating from epistemic communities, interplay of inter-
ests, power structure, and socio-political context.116 More complex
106 See id.
107 See id.
108 See id.; Young, Rights, Rules, and Resources in World Affairs, supra note 95, at 7.
109 Young, Rights, Rules, and Resources in World Affairs, supra note 95, at 8 (“International
commons are . . . systems that lie wholly or largely outside the jurisdiction of any indi-
vidual member of international society but that are of interest to two or more of them . . .
[e]xamples . . . include high seas fisheries”).
110 Id. at 8 (“Shared natural resources . . . are . . . systems that extend into or across the
jurisdictions of two or more members of international society.” One example is “pools of
oil that underlie areas subject to the jurisdiction of two or more states.”).
111 Id. at 8 (“Transboundary externalities arise when activities occurring wholly within
the jurisdiction of one state nevertheless produce (normally unintended) consequences
that affect the welfare of those located in other jurisdictions.”).
112 See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 97, at 84–87.
113 See ORAN R. YOUNG, CREATING REGIMES: ARCTIC ACCORDS AND INTERNATIONAL
GOVERNANCE 2 (1998) [hereinafter YOUNG, CREATING REGIMES].
114 See Young, Rights, Rules, and Resources in World Affairs, supra note 95, at 10–11(The
“approach . . . focuses on processes rather than problem structure and features a dis-
tinction among spontaneous or self-generating regimes, imposed regimes and negotiated
regimes.”); see also YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 97, at 84–87.
115 ORAN YOUNG & GAIL OSHERENKO, POLAR POLITICS: CREATING INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES 1–2 (Oran R. Young & Gail Osherenko eds., 1993); Young,
Rights, Rules, and Resources in World Affairs, supra note 95, at 11; YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION, supra note 91, at 84–95.
116 Young, Rights, Rules, and Resources in World Affairs, supra note 95, at 12.
2010] INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME COMPLIANCE 507
analytical systems are geared toward differentiating between successful
and unsuccessful international environmental regime formation.117 Issues
entailing value conflicts may thus prove less amenable to constructive
management than those featuring conflicts of interest.118 By the same
token, the characteristics of certain problems—e.g., coordination versus
collaboration situations in that, in the parlance of game theory, the former
have at least one equilibrium outcome—facilitate smooth adjustment in
social/international settings, whereas others do not.119
International environmental regimes are dynamic rather than
static.120 Their attributes, which include content parameters, functional
scope, geographical domain, membership, and procedural mechanisms,
often undergo substantial transformations over time.121 The study of re-
gime change may be viewed as an extension of regime formation.122 Some
of the work in this area is predominantly descriptive in nature, outlining
evolutionary patterns, specifically, endogenous or internally-induced
versus exogenous or externally-induced and incremental or gradual
versus discontinuous or nonlinear.123 Other research is oriented toward
finding explanations for departures from the status quo along the lines
followed in examining regime formation. Ultimately, the models relied
upon in both spheres are inspired by utilitarian, realist, institutional, and
cognitivist schools of thought.124
The consequences of international environmental regimes fall into
two categories: simple effectiveness125 and broader effects.126 The former
refers to the extent to which specific regime goals (liberally defined) are
fulfilled,127 and the latter are expected to reflect impacts that manifest
themselves beyond a reasonably well-defined issue area.128 With respect to
117 Id. at 10–11.
118 Id. at 10.
119 Id.
120 See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 97, at 31.
121 See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 91, at 96–103.
122 See id. at 95–96 (“[T]hey evolve continuously in response to their own inner dynamics
as well as to changes in the political, economic and social environments.”); see also YOUNG,
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 97, at 31–32.
123 YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 97, at 31–32.
124 See id. at 84–87.
125 See Oran R. Young, The Consequences of International Regimes, in REGIME
CONSEQUENCES: METHODOLOGICAL CHALLENGES AND RESEARCH STRATEGIES 3, 5–7
(Arild Underdal & Oran R. Young eds., 2004) [hereinafter Young, Consequences of
International Regimes).
126 See id. at 7–11.
127 See id. at 5–7.
128 See id. at 7–11.
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regime effectiveness, the adjective “simple” is preferred to “narrow”, but
this does not imply that the theoretical and methodological issues encoun-
tered are easy to dissect.129 Notably, regime goals may be ambiguous,
controversial, elusive, and fluid.130 Regime standards may also pose
considerable conceptual and measurement challenges.131
Regime effectiveness hinges, inter alia, on compliance.132 In his
seminal work on social justice, the prominent social philosopher John
Rawls draws a distinction between ideal theory and partial compliance
theory.133 The former is applicable to circumstances where principles,
norms, rules, rights, and obligations are invariably respected.134 The latter,
on the other hand, deals with situations in which principles, norms, rules,
rights, and obligations may be disregarded.135 Some international environ-
mental regimes qualify as effective ones, but others receive mixed or nega-
tive scores in systematic assessment exercises.136 Rawlsian-style partial
compliance is a factor in the equation.137
Compliance, in both its substantive and procedural forms, is not the
sole determinant of international environmental regime effectiveness or
broad consequences.138 A scrupulous adherence to the provisions of a
regime, as well as to its spirit, cannot in itself guarantee effectiveness.139
129 See id. at 5–6.
130 See id. at 6. See also YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 97, at 144–145.
131 See Young, Consequences of International Regime, supra note 125, at 11–19.
132 See YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 97, at 146–47 (discussing the
importance of compliance for the validity and effectiveness of regimes).
133 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 351 (1971).
134 See id.
135 See id. at 351–52.
136 See, e.g., EDWARD L. MILES ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME EFFECTIVENESS:
CONFRONTING THEORY WITH EVIDENCE 63, 174 (Edward L. Miles et al. eds., 2002).
137 See ORAN R. YOUNG, RESOURCE REGIMES: NATURAL RESOURCES AND SOCIAL
INSTITUTIONS 36–37 (1982) [hereinafter YOUNG, RESOURCE REGIMES].
138 See Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss, A Framework for Analysis, in ENGAGING
COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
ACCORDS 1, 4–6 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998) [hereinafter
Jacobson & Weiss, A Framework for Analysis]; Harold K. Jacobson & Edith Brown Weiss,
Compliance with International Environmental Accords: Achievements and Strategies, in
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES 78, 83 (Mats Rolen, Helen
Sjoberg & Uno Svedin eds., 1997) [hereinafter Jacobson & Weiss, Compliance with
International Environmental Accords: Achievements and Strategies].
139 See Ronald B. Mitchell, Compliance Theory: An Overview, in IMPROVING COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 3, 24–26 (James Cameron, Jacob Werksman
& Peter Roderick eds., 1996) [hereinafter Mitchell, Compliance Theory]; Jacobson & Weiss,
A Framework for Analysis, supra note 138, at 5–6.
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Several additional influences may be at play.140 The consensus among
international legal scholars appears to be that the implementation of such
regimes should not be equated with compliance.141
Nor should compliance be regarded as an entirely positive phenome-
non, as adherence to the provisions of a flawed international environmental
regime may, for instance, prove problematic.142 Moreover, the broad and
often unintended consequences of compliance may at times be negative.143
For example, they may lead to an erosion of civil liberties.144 In addition,
conformity to the principles, norms, rules, and procedures of an interna-
tional environmental regime may be a costly proposition.145 The financial
burden may include a wide range of transaction costs, notably those associ-
ated with efforts to monitor performance and deter or handle violations.146
Some of the research directed at compliance with international
environmental regimes is of the descriptive variety. The purpose is to
determine its prevalence and the forms that it typically assumes. With
respect to the latter, a distinction is commonly drawn between cen-
tralized and decentralized compliance mechanisms.147 A more elaborate
classificatory scheme, but one that reflects broadly similar structural
patterns, differentiates between spontaneous compliance148 and induced
140 See, e.g., YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 97, at 150–51; Young,
Consequences of International Regimes, supra note 125, at 5–11; Ronald B. Mitchell,
Evaluating the Performance of Environmental Institutions: What to Evaluate and How
to Evaluate It, in INSTITUTIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: PRINCIPAL FINDINGS,
APPLICATIONS, AND RESEARCH FRONTIERS 78, 83–84 (Oran R. Young, Leslie A. King &
Heike Schroeder eds., 2008); Arild Underdal, One Quest, Two Answers, in ENVIRONMENTAL
REGIME EFFECTIVENESS: CONFRONTING THEORY WITH EVIDENCE 1–4 (Edward L. Miles
et al. eds., 2002).
141 See, e.g., Jacobson & Weiss, Compliance with International Environmental Accords:
Achievements and Strategies, supra note 138, at 83; Jacobson & Weiss, A Framework for
Analysis, supra note 138, at 4; YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 97,
at 146–47.
142 Jacobson & Weiss, A Framework for Analysis, supra note 138, at 5.
143 YOUNG, RESOURCE REGIMES, supra note 137, at 41.
144 Id.
145 See id. at 128–30; YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 91, at 21, 71.
146 See YOUNG, RESOURCE REGIMES, supra note 137, at 128–30.
147 YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, supra note 91, at 43–44; YOUNG, RESOURCE
REGIMES, supra note 137, at 55.
148 M.J. Peterson, International Organizations and the Implementation of Environmental
Regimes, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: DRAWING INSIGHTS FROM THE ENVIRONMENTAL
EXPERIENCE 115, 117 (Oran R. Young ed., 1997) [hereinafter Peterson, International
Organizations] (“Spontaneous compliance occurs when an actor aligns its conduct to
regime prescriptions (or even goes beyond them) by its own volition and would do so even
if the regime did not exist.”).
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compliance.149 Falling between these two contrasting categories is
regime-enabled compliance.150
Most of the work undertaken in this area, however, is geared
toward explaining and improving compliance with international envi-
ronmental regimes.151 The strategy followed is not fully integrated, but
the two issues on the agenda are interrelated.152 The principal focus of
this work is on the factors that account for the adherence of relevant
actors and States to the provisions of a regime.153 These factors, in
conjunction with other pertinent influences, may then be employed, in
a manner consistent with the prevailing circumstances, to enhance the
functioning of compliance mechanisms and, where appropriate, regime
simple effectiveness and broad consequences.154
The explanatory and policy-oriented studies are characterized
by a tension between the utilitarian and realist perspectives and insti-
tutional and cognitivist perspectives.155 The former are inspired by
neoclassical economics and ascribe compliance with international
environmental regimes to actor or State self-interest.156 Adherence to
regime prescriptions is strong when the benefits exceed the costs by a
comfortable margin and weak when the pattern reverses.157 A host of
factors shape perceptions of advantage and disadvantage, and the cost-
benefit calculus often includes probabilistic elements, such as the
likelihood of non-compliance being detected.158
The notion of self-interest is not devoid of ambiguity.159 Institu-
tionalists and cognitivists argue that short-term and long-term utilitar-
ian and realist considerations may diverge.160 While the former may
149 Id. (“Induced compliance occurs when an actor aligns its conduct with regime pre-
scriptions only after others alter their perception of the situation by shaming or
providing rewarding, or threatening or inflicting deprivations.”).
150 Id. (“Regime-enabled compliance occurs when a previously passive actor aligns its
conduct with regime prescriptions because the existence of the regime removes one or
more barriers to action.”).
151 See, e.g., Jacobson & Weiss, Compliance with International Environmental Accords:
Achievements and Strategies, supra note 138, at 92–110; Peterson, International
Organizations, supra note 148, at 115; Mitchell, Compliance Theory, supra note 139, at 3–28.
152 See Mitchell, Compliance Theory, supra note 139, at 3.
153 See Jacobson & Weiss, A Framework for Analysis, supra note 138, at 6–12.
154 See id. at 11–12.
155 See Mitchell, Compliance Theory, supra note 139, at 3.
156 See id. at 6–9.
157 See id.; see also supra notes 142–46 & accompanying text.
158 See Mitchell, Compliance Theory, supra note 139, at 7–9.
159 See id.
160 See id. at 8–9.
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favor non-compliance, the latter may exert influence in the opposite
direction.161 Moreover, self-interest does not always operate as an
autonomous force but comes into play in highly interactive settings,
including interdependent self-interest versus independent self-
interest.162 The corollary is that even utility-maximizing actors and
States may incorporate into their expectations the potential impact of
their decisions or compliance on other players.163
The distinction between coordination and collaboration game-
like situations is crucial in this context.164 In the former, each actor or
State prefers compliance as long as enough other actors or States
choose to do likewise.165 The exact distribution of the net benefits of
compliance hinges on the form of coordination, but once others opt to
comply, the dominant strategy for all lies in adhering to regime pre-
scriptions.166 The international power structure determines which behav-
ioral equilibrium is adopted, with the strong prevailing over the weak,
but has no tangible effect on whether the equilibrium is maintained.167
By contrast, in collaboration games, to which environmental problems
often bear a degree of similarity, “each actor’s dominant strategy is to
violate, even if others comply.”168
Institutionalists and cognitivists relegate naked self-interest in all
its incarnations—short-term, long-term, independent, or interdepen-
dent—to the analytical periphery. Instead, as the key components of a
viable explanatory framework, they focus on international and domestic
politico-economic settings (where discernible shifts, creating new realities,
may impinge on compliance), regime attributes (where ambiguities,
incoherence, inconsistencies, inefficiencies, inequities, opaqueness, and
structural deficiencies may impede adherence), resources (where capacity
constraints may play a negative role), international socio-political dynamics
(which may lead to the internalization of regime prescriptions across
the globe), and even inadvertence.169
161 See id.
162 See id. at 9.
163 Id.
164 See Mitchell, Compliance Theory, supra note 139, at 9–11 (“Coordination and col-




167 Id. at 10.
168 Id.
169 See, e.g., id. at 11–13.
512 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. [Vol. 34:493
Such differences have substantial policy implications. Utilitari-
ans/realists view positive inducements and negative sanctions, coupled
with effective enforcement, as the principal mechanisms to counter the
built-in tendency toward non-compliance with international environ-
mental regimes.170 Institutionalists and cognitivists regard non-adherence
to regime prescriptions as the exception to the rule and a phenomenon
that may be addressed through non-punitive strategies grounded in
logic, which extends beyond probability-adjusted cost-benefit calcula-
tions.171 According to them, the solution lies in removing general and
regime-specific obstacles that prevent actors or States from achieving
the high conformity to which they aspire.172
III. CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND COMPLIANCE
The complex relationship between China and the international
community has seldom lacked academic and policy attention, although
the disposition, focus, and intensity have varied over time.173 At the
current juncture, the disposition is moderately favorable but tinged with
skepticism, the focus is wide, and the intensity is considerable.174 Being
in the limelight is, in this case, the inevitable outcome of the dramatic
strengthening in the economic and military position of a richly-endowed
country.175
Yet, despite its increasing prominence and the conservatism that
it normally begets, China cannot be considered as a mainstream player
at the center of the international politico-economic arena.176 From a
Western perspective, its positioning (dingwei) is ambiguous.177 It is not
clear whether this regional and global power is in, out, or sitting on the
170 Mitchell, Compliance Theory, supra note 139, at 14–16.
171 See id. at 16–23.
172 Id. at 22–23 (“Some international standards rely on efforts to raise obstacles to, and
otherwise prevent, non-compliance . . . .”).
173 See, e.g., Hongying Wang, Multilateralism in Chinese Foreign Policy: The Limits of
Socialization, in CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY: DYNAMICS OF
PARADIGM SHIFTS 71, 71 (Weixing Hu et al. eds., 2000) [hereinafter Wang, Multilateralism].
174 See, e.g., id.
175 See id.; GERALD CHAN, CHINA’S COMPLIANCE IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS: TRADE, ARMS
CONTROL, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, HUMAN RIGHTS 17–28 (2006).
176 See CHAN, supra note 175, at 18 (“China faces many difficulties in its development
path: apart from its huge population . . . it is still a relatively backward developing country
in the midst of drastic and fundamental socioeconomic changes.”).
177 See id. at 25–28.
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fence.178 It may support the status quo, challenge it, single-handedly or
in conjunction with other players on the periphery of the system, or
refrain from providing consistently unequivocal signals.179 Therein lies
the reason for lingering skepticism regarding its strategic intentions.
China’s ambivalence stems from the perception that the interna-
tional community, as presently constituted, is not necessarily organized
in an equitable fashion.180 Rather, it is viewed as an entity shaped by
Western values and interests, underpinned by regimes that are the
product of hegemonic and Western designs and leadership.181 The legacy
of 19th century gunboat diplomacy complicates matters further by
breeding a sense of victimhood, which is slow to dissipate in the face of
shifting power realities of China’s rise and Western stagnation.182 The
prevailing belief, apparently, is that the country “owes nothing to the
outside world.”183
From a Western standpoint, historical experience is also not entirely
reassuring with respect to the potential for ongoing smooth interaction
within an established politico-economic order.184 China has experienced
cycles of international cooperation and withdrawal throughout its
existence.185 The post-1978 open door policy has been vigorously pur-
sued for over three decades, but it was preceded by an almost equally
long period characterized by virtually total isolation and hostility.186
Recent developments are regarded as a cause for cautious optimism, yet
strategic reversals cannot be ruled out altogether.187
The corollary is that subtly socializing China, or rendering it gen-
erally compliant with the international politico-economic status quo, is a
Western policy goal, explicitly or implicitly.188 As is often the case in such
intricate circumstances, it may have unintended consequences.189 Learn-
ing through active participation in international community processes
178 See id. at 26, 28.
179 See id. at 25–28.
180 See id. at 25.
181 See id.
182 See CHAN, supra note 175, at 25–27.
183 See id. at 13.
184 See id. at 30–31.
185 See id. 31–32.
186 See id.
187 See id.
188 See Wang, Multilateralism, supra note 173, at 71.
189 See id. at 71–72 (mentioning the Cold War as an example).
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and passive exposure via parallel channels may indeed encourage liberal-
style cooperation.190 It may, however, heighten awareness of the use of
power in international settings and reinforce strategies rooted in notions
of realpolitik.191
Besides direct and indirect policy action geared toward maximiz-
ing constructive compliance, there is a systematic effort to determine
whether China is, in fact, living up to such lofty, albeit somewhat
asymmetrical, expectations.192 The issue is couched at the strategic level
in terms of actor or State responsibility.193 The fundamental question in
this context for those acutely sensitive to the benefits of Chinese cooper-
ation and the costs of confrontation or indifference is whether this
increasingly powerful country is behaving in an internationally respon-
sible fashion.194
Western definitions of State responsibility encapsulate liberal-
democratic principles, including “humanity—is the raison d’etre of any
legal system . . . the protection and development of the human dignity of
the individual . . . [and] to maximize benefits not for states but for indi-
viduals living within States, all the way from freedom of speech and
elections, on the one hand, to freedom from hunger and the right to
education.”195 More specific international legal definitions emphasize the
binding nature of reciprocal obligations linking States.196
One attempt to synthesize the key elements found in the multi-
level definitions has yielded a conceptual scheme consisting of three
principal dimensions: national responsibility, international responsibil-
ity, and humanitarian responsibility.197 The first refers to the State’s
responsibility toward its own citizens, such as safeguarding their per-
sonal security.198 The second refers to the state’s responsibility vis-à-vis
other states, such as contributing to the maintenance of international
190 See id. at 81–82.
191 See id. at 82.
192 See, e.g., CHAN, supra note 175.
193 See id. at 11–30.
194 See id. at 30–32.
195 See LORI F. DAMROSCH, LOUIS HENKIN & SEAN D. MURPHY, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 19 (3d ed. 1993).
196 See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 778–843 (Cambridge University Press
6th ed. 2008).
197 ROBERT JACKSON & GEORG SORENSEN, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
Theories and Approach 146–48 (Oxford University Press 3d ed. 2007).
198 Id. at 146–47.
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peace and order.199 The third refers to the state’s responsibility to adhere
to universal humanitarian standards, notably, in the promotion and
protection of human rights.200
Many Chinese scholars, whether or not echoing the official line,
have not embraced this scheme or the underlying spirit.201 These schol-
ars draw a distinction between the responsibilities of general powers,
regional powers, and superpowers.202 These actors have different local,
regional, and global responsibilities.203 General powers are expected
“[t]o pursue basic security and basic wealth [locally] . . . [t]o acquire
‘strategic borders’” regionally and do little globally.204 The function of
regional powers is “[t]o secure basic security and basic wealth [locally]
. . . [t]o acquire ‘security circles’” regionally and to exercise growing
influence globally.”205
China is viewed as a middle-ranking or regional power because
of its relative underdevelopment and the serious challenges that it
faces.206 Thus, it need not exercise the responsibilities of superpowers,
which include the imperative “[t]o consolidate basic security and basic
wealth [locally] . . . [t]o acquire spheres of influence [regionally] . . . [and]
[t]o dominate the global order.”207 It is interesting to note that this
classification is virtually devoid of any liberal-democratic elements and
is heavily skewed toward security considerations, both economic and
militaristic.208
Given such divergent constructions across the two sides of the
cultural divide, assessment of China’s actions in terms of responsibility-
centered criteria is a task fraught with considerable difficulties.209
Because the research conducted in this area is largely inspired by
Western paradigms, most proposed evaluation schemes are not likely
to fully reflect the underlying differences.210 Indeed, even Chinese
scholars tend to approach the subject from an essentially conventional
199 Id. at 147.
200 Id. at 147–48.
201 See, e.g., CHAN, supra note 175, at 39–42.
202 Id. at 40–41.
203 Id. at 41.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 41–42.
207 CHAN, supra note 175, at 41.
208 See id. at 41.
209 See id. at 43–44.
210 See id.
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perspective.211 For example, one scholar highlights the relevance of
“collective governance, acceptance of the norms of the international
community, awareness of security interdependence, management of the
regional balance of power, and non-initiation of conflicts.”212
The perpetual chasm and risk of selective representation not-
withstanding, this is territory in which students of global affairs have
chosen to tread. One particularly ambitious empirically based, but not
quantitatively oriented, project has employed participation in multilat-
eral institutions as a proxy for responsible state conduct since it is a
behavioral dimension which is relatively easy to operationalize and
where the issue of data availability does not pose serious difficulties.213
The picture that has emerged is mixed. On the positive side,
passive participation, in the form of membership, is strong; moreover,
the trend, across the board is toward greater involvement.214 On the
negative side, active participation, which entails monetary, personnel
and policy contributions, as well as physical support, leaves something
to be desired from a Western viewpoint.215 China would presumably
counter, however, that such a trend is a reflection of its–and perhaps the
entire international periphery’s–historical marginalization, and Chinese
involvement is commensurate with the country’s perceived status as a
middle-ranking power undergoing rapid, but uneven, modernization.216
Compliance, a strategically and hierarchically related but not
theoretically and practically overlapping concept, is less socio-culturally
bound than responsibility and consequently more amenable to analyti-
cal and empirical manipulation.217 Compliance should not be considered
in isolation, particularly when applied in complex historical settings,
yet it is inevitably likely to be subject to greater academic and policy
scrutiny than notions over which international opinion is deeply di-
vided.218 On the face of it, the issues confronted in addressing the
211 See Sijin Cheng, Gauging China’s Capabilities and Intentions Under Deng and Mao,
in POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY IN WORLD AFFAIRS: REFORMATION VERSUS
TRANSFORMATION 103 (Cathal J. Nolan ed., 2004).
212 Id.
213 See CHAN, supra note 175, at 46–61 (analyzing membership, monetary, personnel
and policy contributions, and being host to headquarters and secretariats as indicators
of participation).
214 See id. at 46–47.
215 See id. at 50–57.
216 See id. at 56–59.
217 See id. at 63–67.
218 See id. at 65.
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correspondence between regime prescriptions and actor or State behav-
ior appear to be technical rather than fundamental in nature.219
The intricacy of these issues should not be minimized. Notably,
there is considerable scope for conflicting interpretations as to what
constitutes non-compliance.220 Weak adherence to regime prescriptions
may thus be portrayed as falling in the following categories: “[m]inor
technical or inadvertent problem . . . [d]ifferent interpretations or gaps
in treaty language . . . [s]ignificant, detected, overt violations . . . [s]ig
nificant, detected, but covert violations . . . [and] suspected covert
violations of possible significance.”221 The standards of proof relied upon
in such circumstances, such as “a smoking gun . . . a preponderance of
evidence . . . [or] beyond a reasonable doubt,” also vary substantially.222
Again, however, these are deemed to be less intractable issues, and
the subject of state compliance thus attracts ongoing attention on a scale
that State responsibility does not.223 This attention also manifests itself in
more concrete forms and China is no exception: its adherence to interna-
tional regime prescriptions has been examined broadly224 and in specific
policy domains, including arms control,225 human rights,226 and trade.227
219 CHAN, supra note 175, at 69–70.
220 Id. at 69.
221 Id. at 70.
222 Id. at 69.
223 See id. at 63–68.
224 See, e.g., id. at 70–76.
225 See, e.g., CHAN, supra note 175, at 111–142; see also WENDY FRIEMAN, CHINA, ARMS
CONTROL, AND NONPROLIFERATION (2004); Michael Swaine & Alastair I. Johnston,
China and Arms Control Institutions, in CHINA JOINS THE WORLD: PROGRESS AND
PROSPECTS (Elizabeth C. Economy & Michel Oksenberg eds., 1999).
226 See, e.g., CHAN, supra note 175, at 173–202. See generally ANN KENT, BETWEEN FREEDOM
AND SUBSISTENCE: CHINA AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1993); ANN KENT, CHINA, THE UNITED
NATIONS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE LIMITS OF COMPLIANCE (1999); Ann Kent, Chinese
Values and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN ASIA: A REASSESSMENT OF THE ASIAN
VALUE DEBATE 83 (Leena Avonius & Damien Kingsbury eds., 2008); Andrew J. Nathan,
China and the International Human Rights Regime, in CHINA JOINS THE WORLD 136
(Elizabeth C. Economy & Michel Oksenberg eds., 1999).
227 See, e.g., CHAN, supra note 175, at 79–109. See generally NICHOLAS R. LARDY,
INTEGRATING CHINA INTO THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2002); Jeremy Paltiel, Hinges and
Latches on the Open Door: The Normative Parameters of China’s WTO Accession, in
CHINA’S REFORMS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY 131 (David Zweig & Zhimin
Chen eds., 2007); Margaret M. Pearson, China’s Integration into the International Trade and
Investment Regime, in CHINA JOINS THE WORLD: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 161 (Elizabeth
C. Economy & Michel Oksenberg eds., 1999); Gerald Chan, China and the WTO: The Theory
and Practice of Compliance, 4 INT’L REL. ASIA-PAC. 47 (2004); Icksoo Kim, Accession into the
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The environment, too, has loomed on the research agenda, albeit with
a bias toward the domestic side.
At the general level, China’s international legal compliance has
been proxied by its treaty engagement.228 This is not an entirely satis-
factory measure because not all treaties are equal and it does not
encompass non-treaty–i.e., customary and soft–law.229 Moreover, sign-
ing a treaty is not tantamount to observing its letter and spirit.230
Nevertheless, the escalation in treaty commitments during the post-
1978 reform era cannot be overlooked.231 It is indicative of a far more
constructive posture than seen during the preceding revolutionary
period; although, the consensus view as conventionally articulated is that
there is considerable room for further improvement.232
This pattern is witnessed across the policy spectrum. The meth-
odological instruments employed to gauge compliance are predomi-
nantly qualitative in nature.233 To the extent that quantitative tools are
used, there is a tendency to rely on membership or participation in
regimes as the principal measurement vehicle.234 The picture painted
is mixed overall but uneven in terms of individual spheres of govern-
ment activity.235 Interestingly, compliance with WTO provisions, which
is potentially costly, qualifies as satisfactory.236 The arms control and
human rights records, particularly the latter, are less solid, yet perhaps
better than might be expected in the circumstances and improving over
time.237 Where adherence to regime prescriptions leaves something to
be desired, from the perspective of regime architects and controllers,
direct and indirect international pressure is brought to bear on China
at strategically and tactically appropriate junctures.238 It is a moot
WTO: External Pressure for Internal Reforms in China, 11 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 433 (2002);
Miron Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, The Political Economy of Sovereignty Revisited: A Re-
examination of the Public Choice Model in Light of China’s Accession to the World Trade
Organization, 7 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. TRADE L. 115 (2007).
228 See generally CHAN, supra note 175, at 70–76 (discussing China’s treaty engagement).
229 Id. at 64.
230 Id. at 70.
231 See id. at 73–76.
232 See id.
233 See id. at 204.
234 See CHAN, supra note 175, at 204.
235 See id.
236 See id. at 205.
237 See id.
238 See id. at 207–09.
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point whether such efforts are well-orchestrated and whether they are
entirely effective.239
No wide-ranging and cohesive theoretical framework emerges, but
ample analytical insights are provided. They principally pertain to factors
facilitating and impeding compliance.240 These factors do not fall into a
single theoretical category; some are consistent with utilitarian and
realist assertions.241 Others lend support to institutionalist and cognitivist
arguments.242 It is reasonable to claim, on the basis of the macro- and
micro-level explorations undertaken, that knowledge regarding actor and
State adherence to international regime prescriptions needs to be built
from the bottom up by methodically aggregating findings generated in
specific policy domains such as ecosystem management.243
IV. THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT
As indicated, international legal compliance tends to vary from
one issue area to another. This is most likely to be the case in large,
heterogeneous, and fast-industrializing countries.244 Intense centrifugal
pressures throughout the public decision making pyramid are bound to
reinforce the strategic divergence.245 China fits those criteria.246 This,
in conjunction with the inherently different nature of the problems
faced by the Party and State bureaucracy in individual spheres of socio-
economic activity, explains why adherence to international ecological
regime prescriptions does not follow a pattern entirely consistent with
that witnessed elsewhere.247
At the same time, the underlying centripetal forces, autonomous
or policy induced, bring about a certain degree of system-wide har-
mony.248 In terms of treaty engagement, a pivotal variable encountered
earlier, it is not surprising to note that the level of involvement on the
environmental front was distinctly low before 1978 and that it rose
239 See id. at 201–02.
240 See, e.g.,CHAN, supra note 175, at 66.
241 See id. at 64, 90, 99.
242 See id.
243 See id. at 151, 207.
244 See id. at 204–05; LIEBERTHAL, supra note 30, at 321, 330.
245 See LIEBERTHAL, supra note 30, at 286, 301.
246 See generally id. at 245–335.
247 See id. at 288.
248 See id. at 323.
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dramatically in subsequent years.249 Clearly, the fundamental ideological
and policy shift that materialized shortly following the death of Mao
Zedong has propelled the whole decision making apparatus toward
greater openness/international engagement.250
As pointed out previously, signing treaties, even willingly and
virtually without exception, should not be equated with scrupulous
international legal compliance.251 Actor and State motivations for
entering into an agreement and its capabilities to conclude this phase
of the process may be stronger than those that come into play during
the maintenance stage.252 That said, treaty engagement on such a scale
is arguably indicative of a growing propensity to play by the rules of the
evolving international environmental game, subject to the proviso that
other things need to be equal.253
Additional proxies employed to gauge, qualitatively as well as quan-
titatively, China’s compliance with the emerging ecological world order
have included robust policy commitments and substantial measures—
including legislative, regulatory, judicial, and administrative measures
at the national and sub-national levels—to build environmental protec-
tion machinery.254 It has thus been argued that its leaders, and elites
in general, have embraced unambiguously and with an increasing sense
of urgency the principle of sustainable development as widely construed.255
While they expect developed countries to contribute proportionally
more toward its fulfillment, this is not necessarily supposed to detract
from their own strategic obligations.256
A policy commitment, however strong, cannot be viewed in iso-
lation. China has other overarching goals, notably rapid economic ex-
pansion, which probably serves best the interests of the political regime
and ruling elite.257 It is a moot point to determine the extent to which the
country’s leaders are willing to sacrifice output growth for environmental
249 See Alastair Iain Johnston, China and International Environmental Institutions: A
Decision Rule Analysis, in ENERGIZING CHINA: RECONCILING ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH  570 (Michael B. McElroy, Chris P. Nielsen &
Peter Lydon eds., 1998); CHAN, supra note 175, at 70–76.
250 See LIEBERTHAL, supra note 30, at 335; CHAN, supra note 175, at 70–76.
251 See CHAN, supra note 175, at 70.
252 See id. at 75–76.
253 See id. at 149.
254 See id. at 149–54.
255 Id. at 150.
256 See id. at 150–51.
257 See CHAN, supra note 175, at 152, 212–13.
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preservation/sustainable development.258 There is an apparent desire
to shift from extensive to intensive modes of industrial production, and
concrete steps have been taken toward this end.259 The balancing act,
however, still definitely favors vigorous economic expansion, albeit less
emphatically than in the past.260
In addition to some fine-tuning of strategic priorities, there has
been a veritable outpouring of ecologically friendly legislative and regula-
tory initiatives during the more mature phases of the reform era.261 The
ambitious 1989 Environmental Protection Act, which constitutes the
framework legislation in this policy domain, is generally regarded as a
watershed in the evolution of the statutory response to the ecological
challenge, but there have been numerous similarly-inspired specific
pieces of legislation (e.g., air pollution and control law, noise pollution
prevention and control law, solid waste prevention and control law, water
pollution and prevention law, natural resources conservation law, and
criminal law).262 The underlying principles have been incorporated into
a host of government strategies, such as cleaner production concepts,
environmental liability tenets, environmental management, land plan-
ning rules, prevention first approaches, and treble simultaneity princi-
ples.263
258 See Zhang & Wang, China’s Sustainable Development Strategy and International
Cooperation on Environment, in IMPLEMENTING INTERNATIONAL LAW IN GERMANY AND
CHINA 7–9 (Zhenghua Tao & Rudiger Wolfrum eds., 2001). See generally ECONOMY, supra
note 3, at 91–128 (claiming that China’s reforms have been successful but insufficient in
meeting environmental challenges). But cf. CHAN, supra note 175, at 151–52 (discussing
the gains that the Chinese environmental protection group has made against the ministry
responsible for economic policies).
259 See Zhang & Wang, China’s Sustainable Development Strategy and International
Cooperation on Environment, supra note 258, at 7–9. See generally ECONOMY, supra note
3, at 91–128 (claiming that China’s reforms have been successful but insufficient in
meeting environmental challenges); LIEBERTHAL, supra note 30, at 279–81 (discussing
environmental problems that originated in China before 1978); MURRAY & COOK, supra
note 13, at 178–209 (discussing China’s guiding principles and policies in addressing
environmental issues).
260 See MURRAY & COOK, supra note 13, at 54–97, 213; ECONOMY, supra note 3, at 81;
LIEBERTHAL, supra note 30, at 281–286 (discussing Maoism and the environment in China).
261 See CHAN, supra note 175, at 143–71.
262 See id.
263 See generally id.; ROSS, supra note 13; Michel Oksenberg & Elizabeth C. Economy,
China: Implementation under Economic Growth and Market Reform, in ENGAGING
COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
ACCORDS 353, 353–94 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K. Jacobson eds., 1998); BARBARA
J. SINKULE & LEONARD ORTOLANO, IMPLEMENTING ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN CHINA
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An elaborate institutional edifice has been erected to underpin
ecologically-supportive policy, legislative, and regulatory undertakings.264
Its core consists of the National People’s Congress (“NPC”), the highest
arm of the State, whose members meet briefly once a year and have the
collective authority, inter alia, “to enact all ‘basic laws’ . . . and to make
amendments to the Constitution”;265 the NPC Standing Committee,
whose members meet on a bimonthly basis and have the power to pass
laws other than those in the domain of the larger body they represent,
as well as “to interpret the Constitution and ‘basic laws . . .’ ”;266 the
State Council, the principal executive organ, which has the authority
to enact “administrative regulations . . . pursuant to constitutional and
national law”;267 the ministries, commissions and departments which
are competent to issue administrative rules;268 the Commission for
Environmental and Natural Resources Protection (“CENRP”), which
develops general ecological strategies and guidelines, and coordinates
environmental protection efforts under the auspices of the State Coun-
cil;269 and the State Environmental Protection Administration (“SEPA”),
an administrative arm of the NPC, which formulates specific ecological
policies, issues regulations, sets standards, provides guidelines, conducts
countrywide supervisory activities, and exercises nationwide control.270
It should be emphasized that this is not a highly centralized
configuration.271 Relevant ministries, including Agriculture, Energy,
Forestry, and Water Resources have the authority to issue key environ-
mental regulations.272 “Local People’s Congresses and their respective
(1995); Ying Song, The Chinese Environmental Lawmaking Framework, 1 CHINESE J.
INT’L L. 225 (2002); Eric W. Orts, Environmental Law with Chinese Characteristics, 11
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 547 (2003); Richard J. Ferris Jr. & Hongjun Zhang, Reaching
Out to the Rule of Law: China’s Continuing Efforts to Develop an Effective Environmental
Law Regime, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 569 (2003); Stefanie Beyer, Environmental
Law and Policy in the People’s Republic of China, 5 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 185 (2006);
Roda Mushkat, Implementing Environmental Policy in Transitional Settings: The
Chinese Experience, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 45 (2008).





269 Id. at 188–89.
270 See Beyer, supra note 263, at 189.
271 See id. at 188 (“The administrative structure has become increasingly decentralized
in recent years, where responsibilities and functions are split between central and local
institutions.”).
272 See id. at 189.
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standing committees are authorized to adopt local regulations . . .
[consistent] . . . with superior legislation and regulations.”273 Local govern-
ments have the authority to introduce local administrative rules.274 The
Environmental Protection Bureaus (“EPBs”), which operate at the sub-
national level and are funded by local governments, carry responsibili-
ties, subject to appropriate constraints, in areas under their jurisdiction
for all facets of ecological management, including legislative, regula-
tory, organizational, and supervisory.275
As a potentially vital dispute resolution mechanism, the judicial
system has acquired certain breadth and possibly even depth.276 Like
the institutional framework, the dispute resolution body is not a tightly
structured institution, but one extending from the Supreme People’s Court
to the local people’s courts, and encompassing special-purpose courts.277
Other less formal organizational vehicles, such as People’s Mediation
Committees, play a complementary role because of the traditional
propensity to view judicial intervention as a measure of last resort.278
The tradition of viewing judicial intervention as a measure of last
resort is partly due to cultural influences reflecting Confucian misgiv-
ings about pursuing social harmony by reconciling subjective rights of
individual persons seeking to defend their own interests and partly for
political and social reasons rooted in official reluctance to encourage
individual rights.279
While the development of the environmental protection system
has been characterized by a degree of inertia, the process has not been
devoid of innovation, particularly in recent years.280 Non-governmental
organizations (“NGOs”) have been allowed, even selectively encouraged,
to enter the ecological arena and have had some impact on the formulation




276 See Beyer, supra note 263, at 189–91.
277 See id. at 189–90.
278 See id. at 190.
279 See id.
280 See, e.g., Neil T. Carter & Arthur P. J. Mol, China and the Environment: Domestic
and Transnational Dynamics of a Future Hegemon, 15 ENVTL. POL. 330, 332 (2006).
The author states “[i]t has become clear . . . that a major transformation in environmental
governance in China is under way.” Id.
281 See Peter Ho, Greening without Conflict: Environmentalism, NGOs, and Civil Society in
China, 32 DEV. & CHANGE 893 passim (2001); Han Shi & Lei Zhag, China’s Environmental
Governance of Rapid Industrialisation, 15 ENVTL. POL. 271 passim (2006).
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willingness to consider market-harnessing methods, at least in terms of the
final destination, as an alternative to command-and-control regulatory
techniques.282 New forms of litigation have emerged and have not been
stamped out by the political regime.283
Such efforts, which are intensifying, have yielded concrete bene-
fits, and may be indicative of a strategic determination to pursue ecolog-
ical preservation via international as well as domestic channels.284 Yet,
a distinction must be drawn between quantity and quality, and
institution-building should not be equated with institutional effective-
ness.285 Vast legislative and regulatory output has not necessarily
translated into a coherent, consistently evolving, practically meaningful,
and transparent set of regime prescriptions.286
Ambiguity, indeterminacy, and rhetorical orientation substan-
tially diminish the impact of rules and standards as instruments for
guiding and assessing behavior.287 Poor visibility further undermines
their usefulness and credibility.288 Moreover,
[c]hallenging the government’s interpretation of such ‘secret’
legislation presents a formidable challenge to knowing
violators. Furthermore, the ability of local authorities to
disclose such statutes only when it is convenient for them
to do so enables them to attempt enforcement only in . . .
clear cases where they are most likely to prevail.289
Authoritative and clear statutory interpretation may offset leg-
islative opaqueness in certain circumstances.290 In this particular case,
282 See, e.g., MA & ORTOLANO, supra note 13, at 13–32; Richard D. Morgenstern et al.,
Emissions Trading to Improve Air Quality in an Industrial City in the People’s Republic
of China, in CHINA’S ENVIRONMENT AND THE CHALLENGE OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT 150–59 (Kristen A. Day ed., M.E. Sharpe 2005).
283 See generally Alex Wang, The Role of Law in Environmental Protection in China:
Recent Developments, 8 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 195 (2007).
284 See generally Beyer, supra note 263.
285 See id. at 205–08.
286 See id.
287 See John Copeland Nagle, The Missing Chinese Environmental Law Statutory
Interpretations Cases, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 517, 546–50 (1996).
288 See id. at 550 (“[M]any statutes are not published. This is especially true of regional
and local legislation, which foreign entities often discover only after local authorities claim
it has been violated.”).
289 Id.
290 See id. at 253–54, 517–18 (recognizing the value of statutory interpretation in the
United States when compared with the limited statutory interpretation in China, while
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however, the multi-layered and segmented nature of the policy structure
renders that objective a rather challenging proposition.291 As has been
amply demonstrated, “China has developed a nuanced system of ‘leg-
islative,’ ‘judicial’ and ‘administrative’ statutory interpretation.”292 The
key pillars of this system—the NPC Standing Committee, the Supreme
People’s Court, the State Council, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate,
and the lower courts—do not necessarily operate as a well-integrated
and cohesive entity.293
Even if this were not a formidable problem, compliance with
environmental laws would not necessarily improve markedly.294 The
legally sanctioned incentives are, for the most part, simply too puny to
prompt an adjustment in agent behavior.295 For example,
[e]ffluent fees are often smaller than the cost of comply-
ing with the statute, and violators can generally recover
what fees they do pay in order to purchase the equipment
required to meet statutory standards in the future. Like-
wise, some violators of China’s endangered species legis-
lation have escaped with fines of less than two dollars.
Indeed, some Chinese environmental statutes have failed
to provide for any penalties, thus precluding any enforce-
ment of the substantive requirements.296
Vertical fragmentation of the politico-economic structure is an
even more serious source of incentive distortion and incompatibility.297
National and local interests are often misaligned, and the power con-
figuration and control mechanisms are such that the strategic center
in Beijing may not be able to induce compliance on the part of the
geographic periphery, even when it is motivated to do so.298 To some
extent, this is a universal phenomenon, but it assumes a particularly
acute form in such a diverse and vast country that is burdened with a
recognizing that the end results of the U.S.’s vast statutory interpretation and China’s
limited statutory interpretation may be the same).
291 Id. at 525.
292 Id.
293 Nagle, supra note 287, at 525–27.
294 See id. at 540–41.
295 Id.
296 Id.
297 See, e.g., Beyer, supra note 263, at 207–08.
298 See id.
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legacy of politico-bureaucratic reforms not conducive to institutional
coherence.299 As notable researcher Stefanie Beyer observes:
Generally, the success or failure of laws depends on how
effective they are enforced, especially at the local level. How-
ever, local governments are often major shareholders of
polluting enterprises creating an inherent conflict of
interest. Nevertheless, the laws presume that environ-
mental protection bureaus representing a part of local
governments will successfully coordinate with the na-
tional body, SEPA. In theory, the People’s Republic of
China operates a unitary national [S]tate where legisla-
tion and directives emanate from central Beijing to which
sub-national units of governments must adhere. In prac-
tice, however, this high degree of administrative cohesion
does not exist. The laws fail to anticipate the possibility
that certain government interests might diverge sharply
from those of the environment department and create a
major obstacle to strict enforcement of both national and
local environmental legislation.300
As Beyer further points out:
In reality, sub-national administrative departments
rather tend to look to the people’s governments at their
own level than to the central authorities since their fund-
ing and enforcement powers rely on local district authori-
ties. The fact that local governments often sponsor or
own industries themselves and consider environmental
regulation to be incompatible with economic growth
makes it difficult for environmental protection bureaus
to enforce their policy. Although the State Environmental
Protection Agency has formal authority over lower-level
agencies, this national agency does not have much lever-
age in ensuring that national regulations and standards
are enforced at the local level. It is common practice that
environmental issues are treated more as a matter of
policy rather than law and personal relations are often
299 See id.
300 Id.
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decisive. Fees and fines are rarely determined authorita-
tively; instead, they are often negotiated and fall far below
the cost of damage that the harmful activity has caused,
as well as below expenses for pollution control facilities.301
This pattern is largely attributable to flawed policy implementa-
tion strategies.302 During the revolutionary era, China relied primarily
on the bureaucratic-authoritative model, which entails a high degree of
power centralization at the apex of the politico-bureaucratic pyramid,
and the exhortational type, which features ad hoc mass campaigns
designed to mobilize substantial segments of the population in order to
alleviate crisis-like environmental conditions.303 Administrative decen-
tralization, involving a far-reaching transfer of power from national to
sub-national units, was also periodically embraced, with decidedly
negative consequences.304
The market-exchange approach, predicated on the notion that
the pursuit of self-interest by agents within a regulatory framework
grounded in micro-economic logic may produce outcomes consistent
with the public interest, was not considered to be a viable option for
ideological and politically-related reasons.305 Administrative decentral-
ization has been the cornerstone of the post-1978 institutional reform
initiatives, severely upsetting the delicate balance between the national
decision-making apparatus and the geographic periphery.306 Market-
oriented reforms have been implemented in a stepwise fashion, at least
until 1994, and more decisively in the economic than politico-bureau-
cratic domain.307
The chasm between central and local government is believed to
be symptomatic of a broader pattern of authoritarian fragmentation.308
301 Id.
302 See id. at 208; see also Bryan Bachner, Regulating Pollution in the People’s Republic
of China, 7 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 373, 383–84 (1996); Nagle, supra note 287,
at 536–38.
303 See ROSS, supra note 13, at 11–20; Lester Ross, The Implementation of Environmental
Policy in China, 15 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 489, 492–97 (1984).
304 See JINGLIAN WU, UNDERSTANDING AND INTERPRETING CHINESE ECONOMIC REFORM
44–57 (2005).
305 See id. at 54–57.
306 See id.
307 See id. at 57–68.
308 See KENNETH G. LIEBERTHAL & MICHEL OKSENBERG, POLICY MAKING IN CHINA:
LEADERS, STRUCTURES, AND PROCESSES 137–38 (1988).
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This term is employed to convey the idea that seemingly strong one-
party rule is not necessarily consistent with a high degree of institu-
tional cohesion.309 Chinese organizations across the policy spectrum and
at all levels of the politico-bureaucratic pyramid, consisting of units,
kingdoms, and systems that are mostly self-contained, do not readily
share resources and are reluctant to coordinate their activities.310 Lines
of authority also tend to be blurred, leading to an overly fluid configura-
tion referred to as “too many mothers-in-law.”311
Unproductive strategy implementation or formulation games are
not confined to this particular cultural setting. However, the fragility of
inter-organizational relationships in China renders the task of overcom-
ing parochial resistance, building coalitions, and sustaining collective
action a highly challenging one.312 The process is also inherently costly
because it is characterized by a substantial diversion of resources, deflec-
tion of policy goals, administrative friction, and dissipation of energy.313
This manifests itself amply in the environmental domain because “regu-
lated parties are asked to take part in programs that impose costs but
leave them with few direct benefits.”314
A number of micro-level, empirical studies highlight the gap
between regime prescriptions and implementation realities and, by
implication, compliance in that fragmented institutional setting.315 Those
focusing on rural areas, far removed from the politico-administrative
center, are particularly illuminating.316 In Yuhang, on the fringes of
Zhejiang province, merely three out of eight implementation instruments
were utilized, and those three were used rather sporadically.317 Lax
regulation and enforcement was due primarily to concerns about the
309 See id.
310 See SINKULE & ORTOLANO, supra note 263, at 12–20; see also LIEBERTHAL &
OKSENBERG, supra note 308, at 137–38; BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING
IN POST-MAO CHINA 6–12 (Kenneth G. Lieberthal & David M. Lampton eds., 1992).
311 See SINKULE & ORTOLANO, supra note 263, at 16; see also BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND
DECISION MAKING IN POST-MAO CHINA, supra note 310, at 6–12.
312 See supra notes 308–11.
313 See EUGENE BARDACH, THE IMPLEMENTATION GAME 66 (1977); SINKULE & ORTOLANO,
supra note 263, at 46–50, 188–91.
314 SINKULE & ORTOLANO, supra note 263, at 19.
315 See Kate E. Swanson, Richard G. Kuhn, & Wei Xu, Environmental Policy Imple-
mentation in Rural China: A Case Study of Yuhang, Zhejiang, 27 ENVTL. MGMT. 481,
482–83 (2001).
316 See id.
317 Id. at 485–86.
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financial implications of environmental protection for small enterprises
struggling to maintain positive profit margins.318
A survey conducted in rural areas of Anhui province paints a
similar picture: a handful of ecological preservation mechanisms were
employed, and those relied upon were basically ineffective and applied
lackadaisically.319 There was no serious attempt to assess their useful-
ness.320 Potentially more impactful tools and modes of strategy execution
were neither tentatively experimented with nor considered in earnest.321
Rather, regulators and enforcement officers went through the motions
in a minimalist fashion.322
Interestingly, the administrators encountered in the rural out-
skirts of Yunnan province were, at least initially, less passive and more
determined, and yet they failed to come to grips with the local power
dynamics and interest structure.323 They kept on pursuing their agenda
forcefully but mechanically.324 Eventually, local forces prevailed, and the
whole effort yielded meager results.325 The corollary is that structurally-
induced incentive incompatibility hinders effective implementation, and
hence compliance, on the geographic periphery.326
The patterns observed in urban areas are fundamentally no dif-
ferent: as an examination of the execution of cleaner production pro-
grams undertaken in Changzhou and Nantong, two cities in the Jiangsu
province, revealed widespread organizational malfunctioning due to
system-wide fragmentation.327 Vertical controls were poor; inter-agency
coordination was weak.328 Substantial misalignment existed between
high-level strategic guidelines and low-level operating procedures.329
318 See id. at 486–87; see also Geping Qu & Jinchang Li, POPULATION AND THE
ENVIRONMENT IN CHINA 40–41 (1994); Abigail R. Jahiel, The Contradictory Impact of
Reform on Environmental Protection in China, 149 CHINA Q. 81, 94–95 (1997).
319 See William A. Alford et al., The Human Dimension of Pollution Policy Implementation:
Air Quality in Rural China, 11 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 495 (2002).
320 See id. at 498–513.
321 See id.
322 See id.
323 See Benjamin van Rooij, Implementation of Chinese Environmental Law: Regular
Enforcement and Political Campaigns, 37 DEV. & CHANGE 57, 65–69 (2006).
324 See id.
325 See id. at 67–69.
326 See id. at 69.
327 Hongyan O. He & Leonard Ortolano, Implementing Cleaner Production Programs in
Changzhou and Nantong, Jiangsu Province, 37 DEV. & CHANGE 99, 117 (2006).
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Implementation failures were commonly experienced, and there were no
built-in institutional devices to address them.330
Nor has the revamping of the judiciary progressed sufficiently
to alleviate concerns about its ability to function autonomously in a polit-
ical setting where the ruling party enjoys virtually unlimited discretion
to adjust the rules of the game, and the contours of the legal landscape
are precariously fluid.331 Even at this late juncture in the reform process,
the formal independence granted by the Constitution to this potentially
crucial organizational dispute resolution vehicle is severely tempered by
a host of serious constraints: notably, the strong influence of the Commu-
nist Party, which manifests itself directly and indirectly through numer-
ous channels.332
Given its persistently marginal status, the judiciary is inade-
quately equipped financially, organizationally, and in terms of profes-
sional skill level, to fulfill its intended role in policy implementation in
the environmental domain and on other fronts.333 Political preference for
alternative modes of dispute resolution further undermines its institu-
tional capabilities.334 It remains to be seen whether recent proposals to
establish a specialized court to handle ecological matters will be pursued
in earnest and, if so, whether they will materially impinge on prevailing
judicial realities.335
SEPA, another potentially vital element in the compliance equation,
confronts challenges similar to those facing the judiciary.336 Specifically,
it is thought to be a relatively toothless institution deprived of the sub-
stantial financial, human, information, political, social, and technological
resources needed to accomplish its strategic mission.337 SEPA’s organiza-
tional weaknesses result in excessive dependence on locally-based players
who are subject to powerful ground-level pressures and are thus unlikely
to follow central policy guidelines in many circumstances.338 Moreover,
330 Id. at 117–18.
331 See Nagle, supra note 287, at 529–33.
332 See id. Nagle states “The Chinese Constitution provides for a judiciary that is
independent from the other branches of government. That formal independence is
tempered in reality by a variety of constraints on the power of Chinese courts.” Id. at 531.
333 See id. at 531–36.
334 See id. at 550–51; Beyer, supra note 263, at 189–91.
335 See, e.g., Darcey J. Goelz, China’s Environmental Problems: Is a Specialized Court the
Solution?, 18 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 155, 186–87 (2009).
336 See Beyer, supra note 263, at 207–08.
337 Id.
338 Id. at 208.
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weak inter-agency coordination leads to an unhealthy institutional isola-
tion, detracting from its ability to implement a burgeoning regulatory
agenda.339
A degree of caution must be exercised in drawing inferences,
positive or negative, about compliance with international regime pre-
scriptions on the basis of domestic performance alone. Since the latter
may not fully reflect the former, it behooves researchers to incorporate
qualitative and quantitative findings generated by studies explicitly
addressing the international dimension of the issue. Unfortunately,
such information is scarce and selectively focused because it has been
produced for somewhat different purposes. A detailed examination is
available of China’s involvement in the development of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”).340 It
could be possible to tentatively argue that the generally active engage-
ment and constructive posture displayed throughout the process might
be indicative of a strong determination to ensure, subject to the prevail-
ing constraints, scrupulous implementation and compliance.341 This
would not be an entirely unrealistic analytical leap but might not
necessarily qualify as a solidly-underpinned conclusion.
More directly relevant are the elaborate surveys of China’s ad-
herence to the provisions of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer.342 Here, concrete evidence can be marshaled
to demonstrate that, following an initial failure to comply with the
required standards, a pattern of procedural and substantive conformity
has been sustained.343 This is not a simple case in that such a favorable
outcome probably would have not materialized without generous finan-
cial and technical assistance provided via a multilateral vehicle; inter-
national support for developing countries is the norm rather than the
339 See id.; Ferris & Zhang, supra note 263, at 595–96.
340 See generally Abram Chayes & Charlotte Kim, China and the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, in ENERGIZING CHINA: RECONCILING
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 503–40 (Michael B. McElroy, Chris
P. Nielsen & Peter Lydon eds., 1998) (discussing China’s involvement in the UNFCCC).
341 See id. at 513–15; Wu Baozhong, He Kebin, Fan Yuansheng & Zhao Weijun, The Status
and Trend of China’s Policies on Climate Change, in ENERGIZING CHINA: RECONCILING
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 545 (Michael B. McElroy, Chris
P. Nielsen & Peter Lydon eds., 1998).
342 See generally Zhao, Implementing International Environmental Treaties in Developing
Countries, 5 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 58 (2005) (examining China’s compliance with the
Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer).
343 See id. at 61–64.
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exception in the environmental domain, and its existence is no reason for
overly skeptical interpretations.344
Clearly, that may not be a representative sample, and additional
work on the subject is needed to determine the extent of compliance with
international environmental regime prescriptions and identify the factors
influencing it. A comparison with the picture on the foreign trade and
investment front may be appropriate in this context. That is a more
intensively researched area where attention has shifted at the margin
from the half-empty to the half-full segment of the proverbial interna-
tional behavior glass. At the same time, the negative side has not been
overlooked and the studies conducted suggest that, despite the progress
recorded, China remains partially, rather than wholly, integrated into
the global economy.345
Empirical shades of grey, not resting on a comprehensive factual
foundation, inevitably lead to theoretical polarization. Sufficient infor-
mation has been generated, without dispelling the lingering uncer-
tainty, to justify claims expressed either in utilitarian and realist or
institutional and cognitivist terms.346 The latter may have gained cur-
rency in recent years as the process of international integration has
accelerated and deepened, but the notion that robust self-interest is the
principal force shaping China’s environmental policy at home and
abroad has by no means been consigned to oblivion.347
Utilitarians and realists discern a pattern whereby local policy
makers prefer other countries to make firm commitments to alleviate
global ecological problems, leaving China in a position to capture the
resultant benefits and enhance its techno-economic capabilities in the
process.348 Given its size and environmental predicament, China cannot
pursue with impunity a free-riding strategy. Avoidance of international
commitments, as distinct from minimal cooperation, by such a substantial
344 See, e.g., Jimin Zhao, The Multilateral Fund and China’s Compliance with the Montreal
Protocol, 11 J. ENV’T & DEV. 331, 331–54 (2002); Zhao, Implementing International
Environmental Treaties, supra note 342, at 66; Jimin Zhao & Leonard Ortolano, The
Chinese Government’s Role in Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements:
The Case of the Montreal Protocol, 175 CHINA Q. 708, 714–15 (2003).
345 See CHAN, supra note 175, at 79–109; Lardy, supra note 227, at 5.
346 See supra notes 240–43.
347 See id.; CHAN, supra note 175, at 166–71 (discussing China’s compliance with
international environmental efforts).
348 See CHAN, supra note 175, at 162–63; Zhao & Ortolano, supra note 344, at 708.
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player might aggravate global ecological imbalances and is thus not
necessarily the optimal course of action in this particular case.349
Individual/unilateral benefits and community/multilateral ones
are regarded as competitive rather than complementary.350 The situation
is akin to that prevailing in the arms control area, where unilateral
security is deemed to be a superior goal to multilateral security.351 In the
environmental domain, rapid economic development takes precedence
over ecological preservation:
Arguably both valuations are rooted in a fundamentally
realpolitik view of how to improve China’s status in the
international system. The primary route is to develop ‘a
rich [S]tate and strong army’ (fu guo qianq bing), the
former defined primarily by gross economic and technolog-
ical measures, and the latter defined primarily by relative
military capabilities.352
Both physical size and profoundly adverse environmental conditions
at home, however, militate against an unambiguously non-cooperative
posture.353
Another factor apparently looming in the cost-benefit calculus is
concern about international image/reputation.354 A favorable image may
bring trust, facilitate the development of advantageous relationships,
and allow the exploitation of a wide range of potentially profitable oppor-
tunities.355 A poor image may encourage other parties to form counter-
vailing coalitions, increase scrutiny of a player’s performance, and take
punitive action, like the imposition of sanctions.356 The quality of image
and reputation may also have material domestic repercussions in that
leaders’ or power-holders’ standings may be significantly affected.357
Image (xingxiang) is closely intertwined with Confucian notions
of moral hierarchy, while it is also shaped by historical experiences of
349 See Johnston, supra note 249, at 556; Zhao & Ortolano, supra note 344, at 708.
350 See Johnston, supra note 249, at 558.
351 Id.
352 Id. at 558.
353 Id. at 558–59.
354 See id. at 560–62.
355 Id. at 560.
356 Johnston, supra note 249, at 560.
357 Id. at 561–62.
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national fragility, humiliation, and oppression by more powerful
States.358 Image may thus prompt China to be overly assertive or highly
sensitive in dealing with international environmental issues.359 Utilitari-
ans and realists, nevertheless, comfortably accommodate it within their
rationalist framework.360
Utilitarians and realists believe that Chinese environmental
policy making, including implementation, is characterized by a high
degree of stability and revolves around a number of economic-style
principles:
(1) Maximize material capabilities above all . . . . (2) Avoid
high cost commitments . . . . (3) If avoidance incurs image
costs, then try to avoid commitments but join low cost, high
profile activities . . . . (4) If the opportunities to pursue
material gains unilaterally are closed off, and [you have]
little choice but to join multilateral negotiations, then
[you] should try to build coalitions to weaken commit-
ments . . . . (5) If unilateral opportunities to maximize
relative capabilities are closed off, and coalition building
unsuccessful, then [you] should choose the least constrain-
ing options; try to prevent the toughening of any commit-
ments that cannot be avoided (e.g., try to dilute compli-
ance requirements).361
A distinction between adaptation and learning underlies the more
positive reading of the situation by institutionalists and cognitivists.362
It has its origins in debates about the nature of shifts in Soviet strategy
358 See id. at 562.
359 See id. at 562–64.
360 Id. at 564. The author explains that:
Once image concerns enter the calculus these can lead to more cooper-
ative behavior. However, as long as the payoffs from unilateral utility
maximization remain higher than the payoffs from cooperation in the
image gain, the player will have incentives to try one of three tactics:
reduce the effects of image constraints, secure gains from image while
minimizing its commitments, or head off greater commitments without
appearing to free ride, i.e., low cost activism.
Id.
361 Id. at 565.
362 See generally Alastair I. Johnston, Learning versus Adaptation: Explaining Change
in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s, 35 CHINA J. 27 (1996).
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initiated by Gorbachev in the late 1980s and early 1990s.363 Some ana-
lysts attributed the new accommodative stance to a pragmatic adaptation
reflecting diminished capabilities and hence the need to seek an entente
cordiale with former adversaries, notably, the United States and
China.364 Others provided a less restrictive interpretation and suggested
that it was the product of deeper learning featuring the internationaliza-
tion of liberal ideas regarding peace, security, and world order encoun-
tered in the West, culminating in a “new thinking” and breakthroughs
on the arms control and disarmament front.365
Institutionalists and cognitivists opine that China is learning
rather than adapting in the international environmental domain.366 The
original impetus for entering the global arena may have been the prod-
uct of hard-nosed strategic considerations, as distinct from altruistic
motives, i.e., realpolitik versus idealpolitik.367 Yet, as a complete novice
facing a very high degree of uncertainty, it was predisposed, according to
persuasion theory, to comply with international regime prescriptions.368
Moreover, following entry it has been exposed to stimuli bound to trigger
processes of learning and or socialization, and these processes have
resulted in the acquisition of cooperative norms and modes of behavior.369
Such transformation is not assumed to materialize overnight or
to be a straightforward undertaking devoid of any friction and instru-
mental elements. Rather, it is supposed to evolve gradually and in an
iterative fashion.370 Strategic interaction, including tough bargaining,
may co-exist with softer forms of learning/socialization.371 Progress is
363 Id. at 27–29.
364 Id. at 28.
365 See id. at 28–29.
366 See CHAN, supra note 175, at 148–55, 215–16.
367 See Johnston, supra note 249, at 558. See also Johnston, Learning Versus
Adaptation, supra note 362, at 31–36 (discussing the differences between realpolitik
and idealpolitik).
368 See ANN KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE: CHINA, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, AND
GLOBAL SECURITY 245–46 (2007); Jeffrey T. Chekel, Why Comply? Social Learning and
European Identity Change, 55 INT’L ORG. 553, 562–63 (2001).
369 See CHAN, supra note 175, at 153–55, 170–71, 203–05, 214–16; KENT, BEYOND
COMPLIANCE, supra note 368, at 245–48; KENT, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 226, at 240–44.
370 See KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 368, at 64; Yu Hongyuan, International
Institutions and Transformation of China’s Decision-making on Climate Change Policy,
1 CHINESE J. INT’L POL. 497, 518–19 (2007).
371 KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 368, at 51–53; Hongyuan, supra note 370,
at 518–19.
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achieved, but reversals are not uncommon. As the engagement deepens,
however, the players become increasingly aware of their interdepen-
dence and more attuned to the interests they collectively share.372
These theoretical propositions are not without empirical foundation;
there is evidence to support the argument that China’s participation in
ecologically-focused United Nations bodies such as the Commission for
Sustainable Development (“CSD”), the Global Environmental Facility
(“GEF”), and the U.N. Environmental Program (“UNEP”) has had some
impact, albeit uneven, on China’s international, as well as domestic,
policy orientation and behavior.373 The same observation may tentatively
be offered with respect to its involvement in the multi-dimensional and
multi-year global climate change efforts.374
Cultural dynamics is not viewed as an entirely autonomous force
by utilitarians/realists, who deem rationalist impulses to be more potent.
Their treatment of China’s tendency to invoke its cultural uniqueness
in order to be exempted from compliance with international regime
prescriptions is typical in this respect.375 They portray it in largely
opportunistic terms, claiming that it is often deliberately employed to
maximize benefits and minimize costs, even in sensitive spheres of
international activity such as human rights.376
Institutionalists and cognitivists deal with cultural influences
in a more flexible fashion, but this does not necessarily enhance the
cogency of their assertions in the case under consideration here. Reliance
on guanxi, or social connections, may at times bolster environmental
compliance, yet it is normally resorted to for the purpose of avoiding the
associated burden.377 Face-saving tactics, penchant for informal problem-
solving procedures, tolerance of ambiguity, and pragmatism verging on
time inconsistency also undermine compliance and enforceability, albeit
not invariably so. For example, winning environmental awards may be
a face-boosting experience.378 All in all, this is again a behavioral pat-
tern which does not readily lend itself to unequivocal generalizations.
372 See id.; CHAN, supra note 175, at 170–71, 203–20; KENT, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS,
AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 226, at 240–44.
373 See generally Gorild Heggelund & Ellen Bruzelius Backer, China and UN
Environmental Policy: Institutional Growth, Learning, and Implementation, 7 INT’L
ENVT’L AGREEMENTS 415 (2007), available at http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/GMH-EBB-IEA-
2007.PDF.
374 See generally Hongyuan, supra note 370.
375 See, e.g., Kent, Chinese Values and Human Rights, supra note 226, at 87–90, 95–96.
376 Id.
377 See MA & ORTOLANO, supra note 13, at 82–89.
378 See id. at 77–95.
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CONCLUSION
China confronts enormous environmental challenges and dilem-
mas, which have far-reaching regional and global ramifications. The
acute predicament the country faces may be encapsulated in terms of the
three “S’s” characterizing its burgeoning, fast moving, and constrained
society: Size, Speed, and Scarcity.379 A vast population, an exceptionally
high economic growth rate (coupled with increasing social fragmenta-
tion), and severe shortages of natural resources (including energy) com-
bine to form a potentially unpalatable cocktail of intense local, nation-
wide, and cross-border ecological pressures.380 Given the magnitude of
the problem, this qualifies as a truly global concern.381
For China itself, the inherent conflicts and trade-offs raise the
specter of extremely costly adjustments and compromises. It is not con-
ceivable that the imperatives of economic development and environmen-
tal preservation may prove irreconcilable to some degree, or that pursu-
ing the two goals simultaneously may turn out to be a zero-sum game
rather than a positive-sum one.382 For the international community, the
massive spill-over effects, from a polity which struggles to balance its
priorities and whose fragile control mechanisms belie its authoritarian
status, constitute a grave matter.383
This confluence of factors accounts for the rising interest in envi-
ronmental law and policy in China. The academic and professional liter-
ature has focused on both the domestic and international sides.384 The
issue of compliance with external regime prescriptions has been accorded
considerable attention, directly and indirectly.385 While the picture that
has emerged is somewhat fuzzy, several useful inferences may be drawn.
Among other things, there is scope for offering a number of potentially
379 See Peter Ho, Trajectories for Greening in China: Theory and Practice, 37 DEV. &
CHANGE 3, 11 (2006).
380 See generally id.
381 See id. at 23–24.
382 See id. at 13–14.
383 See id. at 3–28.
384 See generally Hongyan He Oliver & Leonard Ortolano, Implementing Cleaner Production
Programmes in Changzhou and Nantong, Jiangsu Province, 37 DEV. & CHANGE 99 (2006);
Richard Welford, Peter Hills & Jacqueline Lam, Environmental Reform, Technology Policy
and Transboundary Pollution in Hong Kong, 37 DEV. & CHANGE 145 (2006).
385 See MA & ORTOLANO, supra note 13, at 82–89; Chayes & Kim, supra note 340; supra
notes 223–27.
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constructive observations regarding research on adherence to interna-
tional ecological rules and standards.
It should be noted at the outset that the work undertaken in this
area is rather uneven. There is currently far greater emphasis in the
academic community on international regime dimensions (e.g., forma-
tion, dynamics, and consequences) other than compliance and imple-
mentation. Regime consequences, particularly effectiveness, at present
loom larger on the scholarly agenda than adherence to rules, standards,
and related processes. The focus on effectiveness is understandable,
given the importance of the subject, but well-designed regimes may not
necessarily elicit compliance on a satisfactory scale.
In the China field, the number of studies addressing conformity
to rules and standards thus remains relatively modest. This is especially
valid in relation to the international side and less so with respect to the
domestic one, to the extent that the two may be conceptually and practi-
cally separated. The notion of effectiveness is explored thoroughly, but
compliance is not. Researchers embark on their studies from different
points of departure, and this may partly explain the divergent pictures
that they produce.
It has been authoritatively posited that international legal com-
pliance consists of:
(1) accession to treaties,386 the acceptance of the norms
that this entails, and acceptance by the target state of
the right of [the relevant external bodies] to monitor its
conditions and of its obligation to respond; (2) procedural
compliance with reporting and other requirements; and
(3) substantive compliance with the requests of the [rele-
vant external bodies], exhibited in international or do-
mestic behavior. At the domestic front, the continuum
proceeds into (4) de jure compliance, or the implemen-
tation of international norms into domestic legislative
provisions; and (5) de facto compliance, or compliance at
the level of domestic practice.387
Environmental scholars, however, do not operate consistently within this
framework.
386 The author of this article believes that this needs be extended to customary and soft law.
387 See KENT, CHINA, THE UNITED NATIONS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 226, at 236.
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Another element in the international ecological compliance equa-
tion not subject to systematic treatment is time. One research team has
highlighted the difference between adherence to regime prescriptions dur-
ing various phases of implementation: “In deciding on which regulations
to analyze, we gave priority to programs that encouraged industrial facil-
ities to be in continuing, not just initial, compliance with environmental
requirements.”388 According to its members, “[i]nitial compliance is a suc-
cessful demonstration that a facility is capable of satisfying a particular
regulation. In contrast, continuing compliance involves meeting a require-
ment over years of routine facility operations.”389 Such distinctions are too
rare, and conformity to rules and standards is, implicitly if not explicitly,
considered a homogeneous concept.
International environmental compliance is rather narrowly con-
ceived. Transboundary pollution in Hong Kong is a case in point. The
management system for addressing the problem has not evolved beyond
the embryonic stage.390 China and Hong Kong might have arguably
adopted a more decisive posture in this respect.391 The issue of the non-
formation, or incomplete formation, of a regime may legitimately be
viewed as inextricably linked with that of implementation and related
processes. Yet, the analytical and practical connections are not brought
to the foreground.
Definitional ambiguities are compounded by methodological ones.
No established procedure has emerged for handling the relevant empiri-
cal material. Qualitative case studies are the most common tool for
collecting information, but it is a tool that is employed liberally. Quanti-
tative operationalization, on the other hand, is typically eschewed.
Different methodological routes are followed, and divergent insights are
generated. Depending on the conceptual structure and data extraction
mode relied upon, China may be portrayed as a compliant nation or a
non-compliant one. Here again, it may be convenient to juxtapose this
pattern with the relative rigor currently exhibited in handling interna-
tional environmental regime consequences and effectiveness.392
388 MA & ORTOLANO, supra note 13, at 173.
389 Id.
390 See, e.g., Peter Hills, Lei Zhang & Jianhua Liu, Transboundary Pollution between
Guangdong Province and Hong Kong: Threats to Water Quality in the Pearl River Estuary
and Their Implications for Environmental Policy and Planning, 41 J. ENVT’L PLAN. &
MGMT. 375 passim (1998); Welford, Hills & Lam, supra note 384, at 156–57.
391 See Hills, Zhang & Liu, supra note 389 (1998); Welford, Hills & Lam, supra note 384,
at 156–57.
392 See generally THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES:
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Theoretically inspired studies on international environmental
compliance seem to have reached a cul-de-sac. The unanswered questions
posed by utilitarians/realists and institutionalists/cognitivists are not
actively attended to. The gap between the two perspectives has not
been bridged. Recent work on adherence to regime prescriptions in
China is not deeply grounded in sophisticated traditional-style theories
geared toward explaining actor or State behavior, which is not an excep-
tion to the norm. Yet, the complex realities encountered in this and
similar contexts cannot be properly fathomed without being based on
a robust theoretical foundation.393
Middle-range theories, which are less macroscopic in nature and
more narrowly focused, are adversely affected by the pause/stalemate.
It is thus not entirely clear what constitutes State capacity for purposes
of environmental analysis in China and elsewhere. The corollary is that
it cannot be unambiguously established whether this factor impedes or
facilitates compliance in any circumstances, as well as whether it is
manipulated/misrepresented by the political regime. Examinations of
the issue in the Chinese context, while systematic, have yielded incon-
clusive results.394
A serious theoretical void waiting to be filled by middle range-
style research strategies is the complex relationship between the domes-
tic politico-economic dynamics and international environmental compli-
ance, which is a subject that previously loomed large on the analytical
agenda395 but has somehow been relegated to the periphery. China’s
CAUSAL CONNECTIONS AND BEHAVIORAL MECHANISMS (Oran R. Young ed., 1999);
ENVIRONMENTAL REGIME EFFECTIVENESS: CONFRONTING THEORY WITH EVIDENCE
(Edward L. Miles et al. eds., 2002); REGIME CONSEQUENCES: METHODOLOGICAL
CHALLENGES AND RESEARCH STRATEGIES (Arild Underdal & Oran R. Young eds., 2004);
JORGEN WESSESTAD, DESIGNING EFFECTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL REGIMES (1999).
393 See KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 368, at 6–30, 221–52; KENT, CHINA, THE
UNITED NATIONS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 226, at 4–7; Mushkat & Mushkat,
supra note 227.
394 See Jonathan Schwartz, The Impact of State Capacity on Enforcement of Environmental
Policies: The Case of China, 12 J. ENV’T. & DEV. 50 (2003); Tim Wright, State Capacity
in Contemporary China: “Closing the Pits and Reducing Coal Production,” 16 J. CONTEMP.
CHINA 173 (2007).
395 See, e.g., David Vogel & Timothy Kessler, How Compliance Happens and Does Not
Happen Domestically, in ENGAGING COUNTRIES: STRENGTHENING COMPLIANCE WITH
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL ACCORDS 19–37 (Edith Brown Weiss & Harold K.
Jacobson eds., 1998); Peter M. Haas, Choosing to Comply: Theorizing from
International Relations and Comparative Politics, in COMMITMENT AND COMPLIANCE:
THE ROLE OF NON-BINDING NORMS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 43–64 (Dinah
Shelton ed., 2000).
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intricate experience vividly illustrates that this inexplicable trend needs
to be reversed as it appears to be the dominant force shaping the coun-
try’s responses on the ecological front.
The marginalization of domestic influences raises further prob-
lematic theoretical implications. The State is inevitably portrayed as
a unitary actor. This may be a correct reflection of realist premises but
not institutional and cognitivist ones. Indeed, even utilitarianism, which
has its roots in methodological individualism, does not conceive the State
as a compact single entity. The high degree of policy fragmentation in
China, which impinges on environmental compliance, highlights the
limitations of an approach that treats the vital domestic structural-
functional configuration as an inconsequential black box.
Numerous models have been proposed to capture the essence of
the Chinese domestic policy-making process. The one given prominence
here is the fragmented authoritarianism construct.396 Many other models
have also been suggested.397 Most assume that the domestic politico-
economic landscape is extremely fluid and heavily segmented; none
would support the notion that the State operates in such a cohesive
fashion that its innate heterogeneity may for all intents and purposes
be overlooked.398
Such models have several dimensions. Among other things, they
widely posit that policy optimization is the exception rather than the
norm in organizational settings.399 Decision makers display bounded
rationality, muddle through incrementally, rely on mixed-scanning forms
of problem solving—switching between shallow and deep search strate-
gies—and even drift more or less aimlessly in a manner analogous to the
random accumulation of garbage.400 This is a phenomenon that insti-
tutionalists and cognitivists fully acknowledge, but it is scarcely incorpo-
rated into their work on international environmental compliance, which
396 See generally LIEBERTHAL & OKSENBERG, supra note 308 (establishing authoritar-
ianism construct in China); Suh-Yong Chung, Is the Mediterranean Regional
Cooperation Model Applicable to Northeast Asia?, 11 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 363
(1999) (discussing the role of fragmented authoritarianism in China’s environmental
policy making).
397 See generally HUANG JAINRONG, THE APPLICABILITY OF POLICY-MAKING THEORIES IN
POST-MAO CHINA (1999).
398 See, e.g., id. at 17–103.
399 See id. at 104–142. The author states “[f]or such reasons, these scholars think it is
hard to credit the optimal model as an actual correction of the weakness and a supplement
of the strengths of other models.” Id. at 117.
400 Id.
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is skewed toward nearly rational modes of cooperation, for example,
virtually smooth learning and socialization.401
China’s ecological travails offer further theoretical lessons. Decision
makers, wherever they are based, often make flawed choices in design-
ing institutions and embracing policy instruments such as opting for
administrative decentralization over the market exchange approach in
implementing environmental strategies. Such choices are the product of
complex organizational realities, as distinct from being the result of
inadequate State capacity, and they merit proper analytical attention.
Otherwise, the understanding of the determinants of compliance with
international ecological regimes will remain incomplete.
401 See id. at 31–34, 56–58. See generally KENT, BEYOND COMPLIANCE, supra note 368.
